认识论的理由是正确的理由

M. Schroeder
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引用次数: 0

摘要

第七章讨论的问题是,我们如何确定一些支持或反对信仰的假定理由是否算作认识论。有人认为,这是一个更广泛的问题的特例即我们如何确定支持或反对任何态度的一些假定理由是否与这种态度的独特合理性有关,而关于信念的更狭隘问题的答案应该得到关于一般态度的更广泛问题的答案的启发。对象给定/状态给定理论作为回答一般问题的突出候选人被引入,但被证明是不充分的。另一种观点认为,每一种态度的正确类型/错误类型的区别源于这种态度的本质,这一观点得到了代表性案例的辩护和说明。最后,通过展示关于信仰本质的不同似是而非的理论如何能够得出不同的似是而非的答案,从而得出信仰案例中正确类型/错误类型区分的含义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Epistemic Reasons as Right-Kind Reasons
Chapter 7 takes up the question of how we can determine whether some putative reasons for or against belief count as epistemic or not. It is argued that this is a special case of a much broader question as to how we can determine whether some putative reasons for or against any attitude count as bearing on the distinctive rationality of that kind of attitude, and that answers to the narrower question about belief should be informed by answers to the broader question about attitudes in general. The object-given/state-given theory is introduced as a prominent candidate to answer the general question, but shown to be inadequate. The alternative idea that the right-kind/wrong-kind distinction for each attitude derives from the nature of that attitude is defended and illustrated with representative cases. Finally, the implications of this account of the right-kind/wrong-kind distinction are drawn out for the case of belief by showing how different plausible theories of the nature of belief can result in different plausible answers to which of the reasons against belief identified in Chapter 6 are genuinely epistemic.
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