{"title":"保证金交易、定价过高和同步风险","authors":"Sanjeev Bhojraj, R. Bloomfield, W. B. Tayler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.786008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We provide experimental evidence that relaxing margin restrictions to allow more short selling can exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. This is because smart-money traders initially profit more by front-running optimistic investor sentiment than by disciplining prices. When short selling is not possible, competitive pressures among arbitrageurs rapidly drive prices to the equilibrium. However, the risk of margin calls slows the convergence process, because arbitrageurs who sell short too early face substantial losses if they are unable to synchronize their trades with other arbitrageurs (as in Abreu and Brunnermeier. 2002. Journal of Financial Economics 66(2--3):341--60; 2003. Econometrica 71(1):173--204). The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"36","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Margin Trading, Overpricing, and Synchronization Risk\",\"authors\":\"Sanjeev Bhojraj, R. Bloomfield, W. B. Tayler\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.786008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We provide experimental evidence that relaxing margin restrictions to allow more short selling can exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. This is because smart-money traders initially profit more by front-running optimistic investor sentiment than by disciplining prices. When short selling is not possible, competitive pressures among arbitrageurs rapidly drive prices to the equilibrium. However, the risk of margin calls slows the convergence process, because arbitrageurs who sell short too early face substantial losses if they are unable to synchronize their trades with other arbitrageurs (as in Abreu and Brunnermeier. 2002. Journal of Financial Economics 66(2--3):341--60; 2003. Econometrica 71(1):173--204). The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.\",\"PeriodicalId\":309400,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"2 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"36\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.786008\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.786008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Margin Trading, Overpricing, and Synchronization Risk
We provide experimental evidence that relaxing margin restrictions to allow more short selling can exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. This is because smart-money traders initially profit more by front-running optimistic investor sentiment than by disciplining prices. When short selling is not possible, competitive pressures among arbitrageurs rapidly drive prices to the equilibrium. However, the risk of margin calls slows the convergence process, because arbitrageurs who sell short too early face substantial losses if they are unable to synchronize their trades with other arbitrageurs (as in Abreu and Brunnermeier. 2002. Journal of Financial Economics 66(2--3):341--60; 2003. Econometrica 71(1):173--204). The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.