保证金交易、定价过高和同步风险

Sanjeev Bhojraj, R. Bloomfield, W. B. Tayler
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引用次数: 36

摘要

我们提供的实验证据表明,放宽保证金限制以允许更多的卖空会加剧定价过高,即使它降低了均衡价格水平。这是因为聪明的交易者最初通过抢先把握乐观的投资者情绪而不是控制价格获利更多。当卖空不可能时,套利者之间的竞争压力迅速将价格推向均衡。然而,追加保证金的风险减缓了趋同过程,因为如果过早卖空的套利者无法与其他套利者同步交易,他们将面临巨大损失(如Abreu和Brunnermeier, 2002)。金融经济学报,66(2—3):341—60;2003. 费雪71(1):173 - 204)。作者2008。牛津大学出版社代表金融研究学会出版。版权所有。有关许可,请发送电子邮件:journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.,牛津大学出版社。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Margin Trading, Overpricing, and Synchronization Risk
We provide experimental evidence that relaxing margin restrictions to allow more short selling can exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. This is because smart-money traders initially profit more by front-running optimistic investor sentiment than by disciplining prices. When short selling is not possible, competitive pressures among arbitrageurs rapidly drive prices to the equilibrium. However, the risk of margin calls slows the convergence process, because arbitrageurs who sell short too early face substantial losses if they are unable to synchronize their trades with other arbitrageurs (as in Abreu and Brunnermeier. 2002. Journal of Financial Economics 66(2--3):341--60; 2003. Econometrica 71(1):173--204). The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.
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