包容玩家的游戏

Arpita Ghosh, Joseph Y. Halpern
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引用次数: 0

摘要

pi- tolerance equilibrium的概念是考虑到玩家对游戏中的收益有一定的容忍度。这个解的概念概括了纳什均衡,并以一种自然的方式提炼了-纳什均衡。我们证明了容忍均衡可以解释囚徒困境和公共物品博弈等社会困境中的合作。然后,我们研究了特别合作的pi容忍均衡的结构,在囚徒困境中,参与者在他们的容忍范围内尽可能地合作。从某种程度上说,合作是由容忍产生的,这些结果为在游戏中控制收益的机制设计师提供了指导,并提出了增加合作的方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Games With Tolerant Players
A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that pi-tolerant equilibrium can explain cooperation in social dilemmas such as Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Good game. We then examine the structure of particularly cooperative pi-tolerant equilibria, where players are as cooperative as they can be, subject to their tolerances, in Prisoner's Dilemma. To the extent that cooperation is due to tolerance, these results provide guidance to a mechanism designer who has some control over the payoffs in a game, and suggest ways in which cooperation can be increased.
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