Leaving Islam from a Queer Perspective

This chapter puts queer theory in dialogue with the study of religion, specifically in relation to Islamic studies and those who have left their religion or are in the process of doing so. It also explores the intersection of sexuality and religion and uses queer theory to investigate the taken-for-granted categories of “normal” and “natural,” asking what they mean in religious terms when religion is studied as a socially constructed and cultural phenomenon. Queer theory does not consist of just one theory, or even a number of clearly formulated theories, but of several different perspectives and ways of interpreting society, culture, and identity (Kulick 1996; Kulick 2005). Queer theory draws on poststructuralism, deconstruction, and psychoanalysis, and scholars such as Michel Foucault (1978), Eve Sedgwick (1990), and Judith Butler (1990, 2003) are major influences in the field. One feature common to all queer perspectives is critique of what is perceived as normative, destabilising the status of norms as “given” or taken for granted. If we apply a queer perspective to people who are leaving religion, rejecting religiosity or religious faith altogether, then the irreligious position can, on one hand, be understood as opposing religious norms and, on the other, also be destabilised and called into question as a fixed, non-religious position (Taylor and Snowdon 2014). In short, no position is safe or stable from a queer perspective. As subject positions, identities, and bodily experiences merge within complex networks of norms, the content of a queer theoretical approach seeks to engage and disrupt these norms, or at least describe and expose them (Schippert 2011). What is interesting from a queer-theoretical perspective is to see how religious norms are socially produced and maintained, and what consequences these norms have for people about to leave their religion. Therefore, reconciliation or disaffiliation with religion should not be considered a static two-sided coin (that is, believing or not believing) but rather as a dynamic process of doubt, ambivalence, and religious crisis. I therefore call for a more dynamic and intersectional approach that views unbelief and disaffiliation as processes combining various subject positions, competing values,