逆向选择下的群体借贷

University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2000-05-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.340581

J. Laffont, Tchétché N'Guessan

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引用次数: 127

摘要

我们专注于逆向选择作为集团借贷的基础。在一个简单的静态模型中，我们表明，如果借款人彼此不认识，就不会产生附带效应。如果借款人彼此认识，群贷实现了高效的借贷。然而，当允许在串通伙伴之间进行转移时，它对串通行为不具有鲁棒性。最后，我们刻画了最优防合谋群契约。

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Group Lending with Adverse Selection

We focus on adverse selection as a foundation of group lending. In a simple static model we show that there is no collateral effect if borrowers do not know each other. If the borrowers know each other, group lending implements efficient lending. However, it is not robust to collusive behavior, when transfers are allowed between colluding partners. Finally, we characterize the optimal collusion-proof group contract.

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University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Law & Economics Research Paper Series

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