密码协议的可证明安全性-精确分析和工程应用

Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1997-06-10 DOI:10.1109/CSFW.1997.596784

J. W. Gray, Kin Fai Epsilon Ip, K. Lui

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引用次数: 6

摘要

我们开发了一种方法，从可证明的安全性证明中为加密协议提供具体的工程建议。该方法用一个简单但有用的协议来说明。该证明是新颖的，并且是第一个公开的证明，它提供了高级协议和多个加密原语之间的确切关系。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Provable security for cryptographic protocols-exact analysis and engineering applications

We develop an approach to deriving concrete engineering advice for cryptographic protocols from provable-security-style proofs of security. The approach is illustrated with a simple, yet useful protocol. The proof is novel and is the first published proof that provides an exact relationship between a high level protocol and multiple cryptographic primitives.

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Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop

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