Belief Revision in the Context of Hume’s Treatise and Contemporary Psychology

This paper examines the emotional and social motivations of belief and belief correction. As beliefs motivate one’s actions, one must examine how one revises an erroneous or harmful belief and what methodology one can employ in order to best facilitate this revision, resulting in more conscientious action. This paper examines belief formation and revision in the context of David Hume’s 1739-1740 work A Treatise of Human Nature, with particular attention to not only Hume’s account of belief and belief revision, but also the interaction of passions, the mechanism of sympathy, reason, and probability judgments. It is hypothesized Hume’s theory of belief will be reflected in contemporary psychology and cognitive science, with individuals more likely to revise their beliefs based emotional and social factors and experiences proposed by Hume. Sarah Paquette Portland State University s.a.paquette@icloud.com https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1173 Volume 9, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 2 | eP1173 Res Cogitans Introduction David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature maintains a uniquely prescient outlook in philosophy, as well as contemporary cognitive research. As Hume recognized, not only the relationship between philosophy and science, but that science can be used to examine human nature,1 he set his sights on uncovering the science of the mind, posited as discoverable using a framework established by the sciences of the time: observation and experimentation. We must first understand the mind in order to understand other sciences, as the mind is the foundation upon which all other sciences rest.2 Hume hypothesized that this new science of the mind is deciphered through “cautious observation of human life,” best conducted in their natural environments as they occur, and in all manner of states.3 Considering Hume’s empirical framework and dedication to uncovering the natural operations of the mind, he may well have been one of the first psychologists in the contemporary sense of the word, fitting cognitive research into his philosophical objectives rather neatly. It is my intention to assess Hume’s account of belief and to further analyze the contributions the Treatise may have granted contemporary psychology. In order to explore the subject, it becomes imperative to examine Hume’s account of belief, probability, passions, and the mechanism of sympathy. I therefore aim to establish Hume’s outlined theory will be reflected in contemporary research, with individuals being more likely to revise beliefs based on emotions, as proposed by Hume. Hume’s Treatise Examined Belief & Probability Belief, defined by Hume, is any opinion or recollection that is “a lively idea related with a present impression”.4 This proposes that beliefs are informed by conceptions of past experiences captured with sensory, cognitive, and passionate faculties. An 1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), T Intro. 4; SBN x. 2 T Intro.7; SBN xvi-xvii. 3 T Intro. 10; SBN xviii-xix. For instance observing others in their pleasures. 4 T 1.3.7.5; SBN 96. Paquette | Belief Revision commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans eP1173 | 3 idea is a fainter copy of the original impression; these copies bear the same passionate and recollected sensory function as the original, but are less forceful in strength and vivacity. They exist in the imagination and memory as a repository from which to draw.5 We must first experience impressions to form ideas that lead to judgments and beliefs; it follows that when we make a causal judgment, we are merely assessing based on information gathered from past impressions. This process begins with our initial impressions and the perceived constant conjunction between cause and effect.6 Repeated experiences result in a custom of belief7 which primes our expectations and future judgments.8 Memories of impressions are then re-enlivened by similar impressions through factors of likeness: contiguity, resemblance, and proximity. With this, we assume that what we experience in the past will be similar to those of our future. Beliefs, opinions, and expectations of causality are therefore the result of repeated experiences.9 It is important to note the weight placed on the feeling involved with belief. Belief is not simply an exercise in imagination. Our minds can entertain many things—something he calls a reverie10—but it does not imply that all comprehended is believed.11 To assent, there must be a lively idea related to a present impression.12 Hume is then asserting that belief is not predicated on reason, but on forceful and vivacious perceptions13 which enliven passions and notions of pleasure and pain.14 This process is attended by memory and imagination.15 It follows then that a proper account of belief includes memory and the recollection of similar instances where the perceived cause occurs prior to the perceived effect, both exist contiguously in time with innu5 Seppalainen, Tom, and Angela Coventry. “Hume’s Empiricist Inner Epistemology: A Reassessment of the Copy Principle.” The Continuum Companion to Hume (2012): 38-56. 6 T 1.3.9.13; SBN 113-114. 7 Or habit of belief. 8 T 1.3.13.19-20; SBN 153-5. 9 T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147. 10 T 1.4.7.12; SBN 270-1. 11 T 1.3.7.7, T App. 3; SBM 628-9, 624-4. 12 T 1.3.7.5; SBN 96. 13 T 1.3.13.19; SBN 153-4. 14 T 1.3.10.4; SBN 120. 15 This includes an impression of the passions and emotions experienced. Volume 9, Issue 1 Res Cogitans 4 | eP1173 Res Cogitans merable instances of “cause” and “effect” paired, and when we experience variations in the anticipated cause or effect that run against experience, these differences are explainable by an unknown but discoverable variable.16 With a standard of proper belief, it follows that there are erroneous beliefs—or unphilosophical probabilities.17 These are mistaken beliefs based on experiences with insufficient information. These include generalizations formed from biases and prejudices. For example, the belief that the Irish are not witty18 could generalize from one unrepresentative encounter and then be promoted cognitively as a rule.19 Rather than “that Irishman lacked wit”, it is assumed that all Irishmen lack wit. This tendency to generalize can be illustrated further; Hume explains that when someone develops a liking for something—a certain fruit or type of wine—this tends to extend to similar things: from peaches to melons, white wine to red.20 It is a natural extension based on similarity. But experiences are not always representative of true nature,21 and Hume emphasizes the importance of reflecting on the context of experiences in order to be conscientious of ways we could have misinterpreted experiences.22 Upon reexamining an interaction deemed causal, there may be an unknown variable determining causality. The objects were then falsely paired by the imagination.23 As a spectator, we may witness an interaction and come to an incorrect conclusion.24 16 T 1.3.9.2, 1.3.15.1-11; SBN 107, 173-5. 17 T 1.3.13.11-2; SBN 149-50. 18 T 1.3.13.7; SBN 146-7. 19 T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147. 20 T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147. 21 True nature of a person, experience, thing, etc. 22 T 1.3.13.9; 3.1.1.15; SBN 147-8, 461. This misinterpretation yields our judgement incorrect. 23 T 1.3.13.9; SBN 147-8. An example of such an illusory relationship could be the fear one may feel when standing too close to a precipice. Even if there is a guard rail, one’s imagination may still re-enliven the fear of falling, even when one is rationally aware they are safe 24 T 3.1.1.15; SBN 461. Hume gives the example of himself being intimate with his neighbor’s wife; the incorrect conclusion is then that the woman is his wife and no adultery is taking place. Paquette | Belief Revision commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans eP1173 | 5 The opportunity to misjudge extends further to circumstances due to internal states.25 These can sway the course of an interaction, making them unrepresentative.26 With this in mind, we are encouraged to consider contextual factors in situations where we find ourselves immediately reactive before forming judgments.27 Incorrect judgments also affect emotions and subsequent actions,28 as we are willed to action by passions29 informed by perceptions of pleasure and pain.30 He observes that humans naturally gravitate to the pleasant,31 and those experiences compel emotional reactions. Hume proposes that both painful and pleasant impressions are necessary in order to “produce an affection of any kind”.32