MAVR:无人机的代码重用、隐身攻击和缓解

Javid Habibi, Aditi Gupta, Stephen Carlsony, Ajay Panicker, E. Bertino
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引用次数: 27

摘要

随着嵌入式系统在性能和可靠性方面的提高,它们的应用已经扩展到新的领域,例如基于无人机的自动交付机制。这些无人机也被称为无人驾驶飞行器(uav),由于它们在许多不同领域的使用,其安全性至关重要。在本文中,我们提出了一种允许攻击者改变传感器值和修改无人机导航路径的隐形攻击策略。由于攻击是隐形的,系统将继续正常运行,因此地面站或其他监测实体和系统将无法探测到正在进行的攻击。在防御方面,我们提出了一种结合软件和硬件技术的策略。在软件层面,我们提出了一种基于细粒度随机化的方法,该方法可以修改可执行代码的布局并阻止代码重用攻击。为了加强我们的国防安全,我们利用我们自己设计和建造的定制硬件平台。该平台以这样一种方式隔离代码二进制和随机二进制,即永远不会暴露正在执行的实际代码以供攻击者分析。我们已经实现了这种防御技术的原型,并给出了结果来证明这种防御策略的有效性和效率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
MAVR: Code Reuse Stealthy Attacks and Mitigation on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
As embedded systems have increased in performance and reliability, their applications have expanded into new domains such as automated drone-based delivery mechanisms. Security of these drones, also referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), is crucial due to their use in many different domains. In this paper, we present a stealthy attack strategy that allows the attacker to change sensor values and modify the UAV navigation path. As the attack is stealthy, the system will continue to execute normally and thus the ground station or other monitoring entities and systems will not be able to detect that an attack is undergoing. With respect to defense, we propose a strategy that combines software and hardware techniques. At software level, we propose a fine grained randomization based approach that modifies the layout of the executable code and hinders code-reuse attack. To strengthen the security of our defense, we leverage a custom hardware platform designed and built by us. The platform isolates the code binary and randomized binary in such a way that the actual code being executed is never exposed for an attacker to analyze. We have implemented a prototype of this defense technique and present results to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of this defense strategy.
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