财产、所有权和员工所有权:员工持股计划中的员工控制

Mark J. Kaswan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

大多数人将所有权与控制某物的能力联系在一起。在美国,员工持股计划(ESOPs)是员工持股的主要形式之一。然而,大多数esop给予员工对他们拥有的公司非常有限的控制权。本文通过考察财产和所有权的理论来探讨这种冲突,以确定参与决策的权利是否如一般所理解的那样是所有权概念所固有的。最后,作者认为,管理员工持股计划的法律应该修改,让员工在公司治理中发挥更大的作用。设计/方法论/方法本文从历史和分析两方面考虑了所有权的概念。作者在约翰·洛克和当代理论家的著作中考察了财产理论的根源,以及当代关于所有权的理论。研究发现所有权有两种类型:法律所有权和心理所有权。在合法所有权中,参与权是固有的但不可剥夺的,所以一个人可以合法地成为某物的所有者,但没有参与权。心理所有权主要来自于控制感。合法所有权授予与财产相关的一系列权利的一部分。心理所有权传达了一种效能感、责任感和控制感,但没有正式的权利。作者认为,员工所有权不仅仅是财产持有,它必须包括对决策的有意义的参与,包括治理。研究局限/启示本文仅关注美国的员工持股计划。虽然研究结果可能是适用的,但它并没有解决其他形式的员工所有权或美国以外的员工所有权。人们将所有权与控制某物的能力联系在一起,所以当员工被告知他们拥有公司,但后来发现他们几乎没有控制权时,这可能会削弱他们的所有权意识。这对公司的成功有负面影响。为了确保有意义的治理权利水平,政策制定者应该修改管理员工持股计划的法律,要求员工更多地参与进来。澄清所有权的模糊性将有助于支持为员工所有者提供对公司更大控制权的论点,这将产生各种溢出效应。独创性/价值实践者和学者都使用“所有权”这个术语,但赋予它不同的含义。在ESOP文献中,法律所有权和心理所有权之间的区别在很大程度上是缺乏的。澄清这一区别将有助于推动有关员工参与员工持股计划的讨论。此外,本文提供了一个原始的财产分析,证明了控制权的重要性,表明传统的员工持股结构可能侵犯了该权利的重要方面。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Property, ownership and employee ownership: employee control in ESOPs
PurposeMost people associate ownership with the ability to control something. In the USA, employee share (or stock) ownership plans (ESOPs) are one of the principal forms of employee ownership. However, most ESOPs give employees very limited rights of control over the company they own. This paper explore this conflict by examining theories of property and ownership to determine whether the right to participate in decision-making is inherent in the idea of ownership as it is generally understood. Ultimately, the author argues that the law governing ESOPs should be revised to give employees a larger role in the governance of their companies.Design/methodology/approachThis paper considers the concept of ownership both historically and analytically. The author examines the roots of property theory in the work of John Locke and contemporary theorists, as well as contemporary theorizing about ownership.FindingsThere are two kinds of ownership: legal ownership and psychological ownership. In legal ownership, the right to participation is inherent but alienable, so one can legally be an owner of something but have no right of participation. Psychological ownership primarily arises from a sense of control. Legal ownership confers some part of the bundle of rights associated with property. Psychological ownership conveys a feeling of efficacy, responsibility and control, but no formal rights. The author argues that, for employee ownership to be more than mere property-holding, it must include meaningful participation in decision-making, including governance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper is only concerned with ESOPs in the USA. Although the findings may be applicable, it does not address other forms of employee ownership or employee ownership outside of the USA.Practical implicationsPeople associate ownership with the ability to control something, so when workers are told they own their company but then find they have few control rights, it may undermine their sense of ownership. This then has negative implications for the company's success. To ensure meaningful levels of governance rights, policy-makers should revise the laws governing ESOPs to require greater involvement by employees.Social implicationsClarifying ambiguities around ownership will help support arguments for affording employee-owners greater control rights in their companies, which will have various spill-over effects.Originality/valuePractitioners and scholars alike deploy the term, “ownership” but ascribe different meanings to it. The distinction between legal and psychological ownership is largely lacking in the ESOP literature. Clarifying this distinction will help to move the discussion forward regarding employee participation in ESOPs. In addition, the paper provides an original analysis of property that demonstrates the importance of the right to control, showing that the traditional ESOP structure may violate important aspects of that right.
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