Conclusion

The book’s conclusion offers a number of overarching observations about the prospects of justice for Syria and highlights a few bright spots on an otherwise rather bleak landscape. These grounds for cautious optimism include the fact that we now have a robust and comprehensive international jus puniendi of international crimes, even if we lack sufficient institutions in which to apply it. Although the repeat failures of the U.N. Security Council have eroded our faith in the post–World War II system of collective security, other multilateral, regional, and domestic institutions have—to a certain extent—stepped in to fill the breach. This multilateral paralysis has thus spurred creative thinking about new jurisdictional theories, generated multiple and varied institutional proposals, and re-enlivened the principle of universal jurisdiction after a period of decline. The enhanced sophistication of international crimes documentation ensures that future transitional justice efforts will have the evidence needed to hold those most responsible for abuses to account. While the many accountability proposals have yet to bear fruit, it is now clear that they suffer from no legal impediments; all that is needed is the political will and resources to bring them to fruition. All of these developments are the work of an epistemic community of justice entrepreneurs—representing multilateral institutions, sovereign nations, and global civil society—who refuse to take “no” for an answer.