共享系统中的多玩家博弈模型与混合策略分析

Mingyuan Yu, Qian Li, Zhou Wu
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引用次数: 1

摘要

基于共享系统的快速发展,本文提出了一个以政府、企业和消费者为主体的三方博弈模型。同时,我们对模型中的每个参与者进行均衡分析,使其利润最大化。我们发现企业决策是影响政府和消费者利益的关键因素,而消费者的利益与自己的决策仅成正相关。结果表明,不存在纯粹的NE,所有参与者只能根据他人的参与概率来决定自己的参与率。最后,该案例表明(不管制、维持、不监管)可能是一种最优的混合策略,可以使所有参与者的利润最大化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Multi-player Game Model and Mixed Strategy Analysis in Sharing System
Arising from the rapid development of the sharing system, this paper proposed a three-player game model that considers government, enterprises, and consumers as the main body. Meanwhile, we carried out equilibrium analysis for each player in the model to maximize their profits. We found that enterprise decision-making is a key factor in the profit of the government and consumers, while consumer’s profit is only positively related to his own decision-making. Results show that there exists no pure NE, all players only could decide their participation rates according to others’ probability of participation. Finally, the case implied that the (non-regulation, maintenance, non-supervision) maybe an optimal mixed strategy to maximize all the players’ profits.
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