基于SPIN的嵌入式SIM远程调配协议的安全性分析

Zhonglin Ding, Yang Hu, Wei Luo, Zhongming Huang, Lei Zhang, Zhongyuan Qin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要:随着5G时代的到来,嵌入式SIM (eSIM)技术应运而生,以满足M2M技术的需求。在早些年,GSMA提供了eSIM无线写入技术的架构和配置协议的详细描述。eSIM卡远程配置协议分为下载配置文件、安装配置文件、激活配置文件、去激活配置文件、删除配置文件四个过程。在该协议中,存在身份冒充威胁、篡改威胁、拒绝服务威胁和窃听威胁等攻击。本文分析了配置文件下载和安装过程中密钥会话建立的安全性。并采用四通道并行方法模拟会话建立过程。攻击者是基于Dolev-Yao模型建模的。通过SPIN模型检测工具的测试,发现攻击者可以在密钥会话建立过程中拦截eSIM和SM-DP的信息。但是,由于攻击者缺乏密钥,攻击者无法从获得的密文中获取有效信息。因此,攻击者无法伪造或修改消息。我们的工作证明了eSIM系统的安全性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Security Analysis of Embedded SIM Remote Provisioning Protocol Using SPIN
Abstract: With the advent of the 5G era, embedded SIM (eSIM) technology has been created to meet the needs of M2M technology. In earlier years, the GSMA provided a detailed description of the architecture and configuration protocol of the eSIM over-the-air writing technology. The remote configuration protocol of eSIM cards is divided into the processes of configuration file download, installation, activation, de-activation, and deletion. In this protocol, there are attacks such as identity impersonation threats, tampering threats, denial of service and eavesdropping threats, etc. This paper analyzes the security of key session establishment during the download and the installation of configuration files. And it uses a four-channel parallel method to simulate the session establishment process. The attacker is modeled based on the Dolev-Yao model. Through the test of the SPIN model detection tool, it is found that the attacker can intercept information from eSIM and SM-DP during the establishment of the key session. However, because the attacker lacks the key, he cannot obtain valid information from the obtained ciphertext. Therefore, the attacker cannot forge or modify the message. Our work proves the security of the eSIM system.
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