Kazuki Nomoto, Takuya Watanabe, Eitaro Shioji, Mitsuaki Akiyama, Tatsuya Mori
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Using the P ERMIUM frame- work, we systematically studied the behavior of permission mechanisms for 22 major browser implementations running on five different operating systems, including mobile and desktop. We determined that the implementation and behavior of permission mechanisms are fragmented and inconsistent between operating systems, even for the same browser (i.e., Windows Chrome vs. iOS Chrome) and that the implementation inconsistencies can lead to privacy risks. Based on the behavior and implementation inconsistencies of the permission mechanism revealed by our measurement study, we developed two proof-of-concept attacks and evaluated their feasibility. The first attack uses the permission information collected by exploiting the inconsistencies to secretly track the user. The second attack aims to create a situation in which the user cannot correctly determine the origin of the permission request, and the user incorrectly grants permission to a malicious site. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
现代Web服务通过访问用户设备(包括照相机、麦克风和gps等硬件设备)上的资源来提供丰富的内容。Web浏览器供应商已经采用了许可机制来实现对这些资源的访问的适当控制,以保护用户隐私。权限机制使用户能够授予或拒绝其浏览器访问每个网站的资源。尽管许可机制在保护用户隐私方面很重要,但之前的研究尚未系统地了解其行为和实现。在这项研究中,我们开发了一个web浏览器分析框架,可以自动分析各种浏览器实现的许可机制的行为。使用permium框架,我们系统地研究了运行在五种不同操作系统(包括移动和桌面)上的22种主要浏览器实现的权限机制行为。我们认为,在不同的操作系统之间,权限机制的实现和行为是碎片化和不一致的,即使是同一个浏览器(即Windows Chrome vs. iOS Chrome),实现的不一致也会导致隐私风险。基于我们的测量研究揭示的权限机制的行为和实现的不一致性,我们开发了两种概念验证攻击并评估了它们的可行性。第一种攻击利用不一致收集的权限信息秘密跟踪用户。第二种攻击的目的是造成用户无法正确判断权限请求的来源,错误地向恶意站点授予权限的情况。最后,我们澄清了在隐私机制中必须标准化的技术问题,并为操作系统/浏览器供应商提供建议,以减轻本研究中确定的威胁。
—Modern Web services provide rich content by ac- cessing resources on user devices, including hardware devices such as cameras, microphones, and GPSs. Web browser vendors have adopted permission mechanisms that achieve appropriate control over access to such resources to protect user privacy. The permission mechanism gives users the ability to grant or deny their browser access to resources for each website. Despite the importance of permission mechanisms in protecting user privacy, previous studies have not been conducted to systematically understand their behavior and implementation. In this study, we developed P ERMIUM , a web browser analysis framework that automatically analyzes the behavior of permission mechanisms implemented by various browsers. Using the P ERMIUM frame- work, we systematically studied the behavior of permission mechanisms for 22 major browser implementations running on five different operating systems, including mobile and desktop. We determined that the implementation and behavior of permission mechanisms are fragmented and inconsistent between operating systems, even for the same browser (i.e., Windows Chrome vs. iOS Chrome) and that the implementation inconsistencies can lead to privacy risks. Based on the behavior and implementation inconsistencies of the permission mechanism revealed by our measurement study, we developed two proof-of-concept attacks and evaluated their feasibility. The first attack uses the permission information collected by exploiting the inconsistencies to secretly track the user. The second attack aims to create a situation in which the user cannot correctly determine the origin of the permission request, and the user incorrectly grants permission to a malicious site. Finally, we clarify the technical issues that must be standardized in privacy mechanisms and provide recommendations to OS/browser vendors to mitigate the threats identified in this study.