{"title":"从决定性胜利到过渡","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0027","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"As the Bush administration drifted from a decisive-victory approach toward transition-and-withdraw, the CPA disbanded, and control was given to the Iraqis. The U.S. aimed to contain the Sunni insurgency so that Iraqi forces could handle it, but decisions surrounding elections and the new constitution further deepened the rift between Sunni and Shia. While the Bush administration kept ignoring the signs, the Sunni insurgency had become sustainable, enjoying local popular and external support.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"From Decisive Victory to Transition\",\"authors\":\"Christopher D. Kolenda\",\"doi\":\"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0027\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"As the Bush administration drifted from a decisive-victory approach toward transition-and-withdraw, the CPA disbanded, and control was given to the Iraqis. The U.S. aimed to contain the Sunni insurgency so that Iraqi forces could handle it, but decisions surrounding elections and the new constitution further deepened the rift between Sunni and Shia. While the Bush administration kept ignoring the signs, the Sunni insurgency had become sustainable, enjoying local popular and external support.\",\"PeriodicalId\":235305,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Zero-Sum Victory\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Zero-Sum Victory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0027\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Zero-Sum Victory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0027","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
As the Bush administration drifted from a decisive-victory approach toward transition-and-withdraw, the CPA disbanded, and control was given to the Iraqis. The U.S. aimed to contain the Sunni insurgency so that Iraqi forces could handle it, but decisions surrounding elections and the new constitution further deepened the rift between Sunni and Shia. While the Bush administration kept ignoring the signs, the Sunni insurgency had become sustainable, enjoying local popular and external support.