Lorenzo Ceragioli, Letterio Galletta, P. Degano, D. Basin
{"title":"IFCIL:用于SELinux的信息流配置语言","authors":"Lorenzo Ceragioli, Letterio Galletta, P. Degano, D. Basin","doi":"10.1109/CSF54842.2022.9919690","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is a security architecture for Linux implementing mandatory access control. It has been used in numerous security-critical contexts ranging from servers to mobile devices. But this is challenging as SELinux security policies are difficult to write, understand, and maintain. Recently, the intermediate language CIL was introduced to foster the development of high-level policy languages and to write structured configurations. However, CIL lacks mechanisms for ensuring that the resulting configurations obey desired information flow policies. To remedy this, we propose IFCIL, a backward compatible extension of CIL for specifying fine-grained information flow requirements for CIL configurations. Using IFCIL, administrators can express, e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and non-interference properties. We also provide a tool to statically verify these requirements.","PeriodicalId":412553,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE 35th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"299 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"IFCIL: An Information Flow Configuration Language for SELinux\",\"authors\":\"Lorenzo Ceragioli, Letterio Galletta, P. Degano, D. Basin\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CSF54842.2022.9919690\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is a security architecture for Linux implementing mandatory access control. It has been used in numerous security-critical contexts ranging from servers to mobile devices. But this is challenging as SELinux security policies are difficult to write, understand, and maintain. Recently, the intermediate language CIL was introduced to foster the development of high-level policy languages and to write structured configurations. However, CIL lacks mechanisms for ensuring that the resulting configurations obey desired information flow policies. To remedy this, we propose IFCIL, a backward compatible extension of CIL for specifying fine-grained information flow requirements for CIL configurations. Using IFCIL, administrators can express, e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and non-interference properties. We also provide a tool to statically verify these requirements.\",\"PeriodicalId\":412553,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2022 IEEE 35th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)\",\"volume\":\"299 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-05-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2022 IEEE 35th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF54842.2022.9919690\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2022 IEEE 35th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF54842.2022.9919690","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
IFCIL: An Information Flow Configuration Language for SELinux
Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is a security architecture for Linux implementing mandatory access control. It has been used in numerous security-critical contexts ranging from servers to mobile devices. But this is challenging as SELinux security policies are difficult to write, understand, and maintain. Recently, the intermediate language CIL was introduced to foster the development of high-level policy languages and to write structured configurations. However, CIL lacks mechanisms for ensuring that the resulting configurations obey desired information flow policies. To remedy this, we propose IFCIL, a backward compatible extension of CIL for specifying fine-grained information flow requirements for CIL configurations. Using IFCIL, administrators can express, e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and non-interference properties. We also provide a tool to statically verify these requirements.