The Reception of Aristotle’s Interpretation of Plato’s Forms in Plotinus and al-Fārābī

This paper makes four arguments to challenge attributing to Plato a theory of Forms. I begin by closely studying Aristotle’s critique of the Forms to show that Aristotle was more focused on the epistemological implications of the Forms as opposed to their existence. Additionally, it remains unclear as to whether Aristotle was targeting Plato or the Platonists in his critiques. I then turn to the inconsistencies inherent in Plato’s discussion of the Forms. Essentially, this is incumbent upon Plato’s commitment to the belief that writing and language fail to capture the Forms holistically. As such, Plato’s variegated discussions of the Forms in the dialogues reflect his commitment to the mutability of the world concurrently with language. This carries over to the reception of Plato and Aristotle in Antiquity and beyond. I show that starting from Antiochus of Ascalon onwards, Plato and Aristotle were accepted to be representatives of a consistent philosophy. This historical ‘harmonization’ of Plato and Aristotle shows that opposition between both thinkers concerning the Forms was not a commonly held view. I then turn to Plotinus who syncretised Plato’s Forms with Aristotelian Intellect which was appropriated by al-Fārābī who rejected the idea that there had been any distinction in the first place. Al-Fārābī composed a treatise on the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, whereas Plotinus based his entire philosophical enterprise on the synthesis of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy that proved historically influential. The resulting thesis of this paper is that any close historical study of Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato’s Forms would show that one cannot attribute to Plato a theory of Forms without facing serious contradictions.