可伸缩的可信软件架构支持

D. Champagne, R. Lee
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引用次数: 183

摘要

我们提出了Bastion,一种新的硬件软件架构,用于在不可信的软件堆栈中保护安全关键软件模块。我们的体系结构由增强的微处理器硬件和增强的管理程序软件组成。每个受信任的软件模块都提供了一个安全的、细粒度的内存分区和它自己的安全持久存储区域。Bastion是第一个在使用管理程序为安全关键型操作系统和应用程序模块提供相同保护之前,为管理程序提供直接硬件保护以防止软件和物理攻击的体系结构。我们的实现演示了绕过不受信任的商品操作系统来提供应用程序安全性的可行性,并且与当前业界最先进的安全芯片可信平台模块(TPM)相比,显示了更好的安全性和更高的性能。我们在OpenSPARC平台上提供了一个概念验证实现。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Scalable architectural support for trusted software
We present Bastion, a new hardware-software architecture for protecting security-critical software modules in an untrusted software stack. Our architecture is composed of enhanced microprocessor hardware and enhanced hypervisor software. Each trusted software module is provided with a secure, fine-grained memory compartment and its own secure persistent storage area. Bastion is the first architecture to provide direct hardware protection of the hypervisor from both software and physical attacks, before employing the hypervisor to provide the same protection to security-critical OS and application modules. Our implementation demonstrates the feasibility of bypassing an untrusted commodity OS to provide application security and shows better security with higher performance when compared to the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), the current industry state-of-the-art security chip. We provide a proof-of-concept implementation on the OpenSPARC platform.
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