临时性激励的持续效应:来自全国健康保险实验的证据

A. Baillon, J. Capuno, O. O’Donnell, J. C. R. Tan, K. van Wilgenburg
{"title":"临时性激励的持续效应:来自全国健康保险实验的证据","authors":"A. Baillon, J. Capuno, O. O’Donnell, J. C. R. Tan, K. van Wilgenburg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3488632","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Temporary incentives are offered in anticipation of persistent effects that are seldom estimated. We use a nationwide randomized experiment in the Philippines to estimate effects of two incentives for health insurance three years after their withdrawal. We find that both temporary incentives had persistent effects on enrollment. A premium subsidy had a small but highly persistent effect. Application assistance offered to those initially unresponsive to the subsidy had a much larger but less persistent effect. The subsidy persuaded those with higher initial stated willingness to pay to enroll and keep enrolling. The offer of application assistance to initial non-compliers with the subsidy achieved a larger immediate effect by drawing in those who stated they valued insurance less and were less likely to re-enroll when the incentives were withdrawn.","PeriodicalId":341058,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Primary Taxonomy (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Persistent Effects of Temporary Incentives: Evidence from a Nationwide Health Insurance Experiment\",\"authors\":\"A. Baillon, J. Capuno, O. O’Donnell, J. C. R. Tan, K. van Wilgenburg\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3488632\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Temporary incentives are offered in anticipation of persistent effects that are seldom estimated. We use a nationwide randomized experiment in the Philippines to estimate effects of two incentives for health insurance three years after their withdrawal. We find that both temporary incentives had persistent effects on enrollment. A premium subsidy had a small but highly persistent effect. Application assistance offered to those initially unresponsive to the subsidy had a much larger but less persistent effect. The subsidy persuaded those with higher initial stated willingness to pay to enroll and keep enrolling. The offer of application assistance to initial non-compliers with the subsidy achieved a larger immediate effect by drawing in those who stated they valued insurance less and were less likely to re-enroll when the incentives were withdrawn.\",\"PeriodicalId\":341058,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Primary Taxonomy (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"40 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-11-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Primary Taxonomy (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3488632\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Primary Taxonomy (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3488632","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

摘要

提供临时激励是为了预期持久的效果,而这种效果很少被估计出来。我们在菲律宾进行了一项全国性的随机实验,以估计两种激励措施在退出健康保险三年后的影响。我们发现,这两种临时性激励措施对入学率都有持续的影响。额外补贴的效果虽小,但非常持久。向那些最初对补贴没有反应的人提供申请援助的效果要大得多,但持久性较差。这项补贴说服了那些最初表示愿意付费的学生,并让他们继续注册。向最初不遵守补贴的人提供申请援助,通过吸引那些声称自己不太重视保险的人,以及在奖励取消后不太可能重新注册的人,取得了更大的立竿见影的效果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Persistent Effects of Temporary Incentives: Evidence from a Nationwide Health Insurance Experiment
Temporary incentives are offered in anticipation of persistent effects that are seldom estimated. We use a nationwide randomized experiment in the Philippines to estimate effects of two incentives for health insurance three years after their withdrawal. We find that both temporary incentives had persistent effects on enrollment. A premium subsidy had a small but highly persistent effect. Application assistance offered to those initially unresponsive to the subsidy had a much larger but less persistent effect. The subsidy persuaded those with higher initial stated willingness to pay to enroll and keep enrolling. The offer of application assistance to initial non-compliers with the subsidy achieved a larger immediate effect by drawing in those who stated they valued insurance less and were less likely to re-enroll when the incentives were withdrawn.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信