Rowhammer攻击注入方法

Keun Soo YIM
{"title":"Rowhammer攻击注入方法","authors":"Keun Soo YIM","doi":"10.1109/SRDS.2016.012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a systematic methodology to identify and validate security attacks that exploit user influenceable hardware faults (i.e., rowhammer errors). We break down rowhammer attack procedures into nine generalized steps where some steps are designed to increase the attack success probabilities. Our framework can perform those nine operations (e.g., pressuring system memory and spraying landing pages) as well as inject rowhammer errors which are basically modeled as ≥3-bit errors. When one of the injected errors is activated, such can cause control or data flow divergences which can then be caught by a prepared landing page and thus lead to a successful attack. Our experiments conducted against a guest operating system of a typical cloud hypervisor identified multiple reproducible targets for privilege escalation, shell injection, memory and disk corruption, and advanced denial-of-service attacks. Because the presented rowhammer attack injection (RAI) methodology uses error injection and thus statistical sampling, RAI can quantitatively evaluate the modeled rowhammer attack success probabilities of any given target software states.","PeriodicalId":165721,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 35th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS)","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"21","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Rowhammer Attack Injection Methodology\",\"authors\":\"Keun Soo YIM\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SRDS.2016.012\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper presents a systematic methodology to identify and validate security attacks that exploit user influenceable hardware faults (i.e., rowhammer errors). We break down rowhammer attack procedures into nine generalized steps where some steps are designed to increase the attack success probabilities. Our framework can perform those nine operations (e.g., pressuring system memory and spraying landing pages) as well as inject rowhammer errors which are basically modeled as ≥3-bit errors. When one of the injected errors is activated, such can cause control or data flow divergences which can then be caught by a prepared landing page and thus lead to a successful attack. Our experiments conducted against a guest operating system of a typical cloud hypervisor identified multiple reproducible targets for privilege escalation, shell injection, memory and disk corruption, and advanced denial-of-service attacks. Because the presented rowhammer attack injection (RAI) methodology uses error injection and thus statistical sampling, RAI can quantitatively evaluate the modeled rowhammer attack success probabilities of any given target software states.\",\"PeriodicalId\":165721,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2016 IEEE 35th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS)\",\"volume\":\"75 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"21\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2016 IEEE 35th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2016.012\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2016 IEEE 35th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2016.012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21

摘要

本文提出了一种系统的方法来识别和验证利用可影响用户的硬件故障(即,rowhammer错误)的安全攻击。我们将铲车攻击过程分解为九个通用步骤,其中一些步骤旨在提高攻击成功概率。我们的框架可以执行这九种操作(例如,加压系统内存和喷涂着陆页)以及注入rowhammer错误,这些错误基本上建模为≥3位错误。当其中一个注入错误被激活时,这可能会导致控制或数据流偏离,然后可以被准备好的着陆页面捕获,从而导致成功的攻击。我们针对典型云管理程序的客户操作系统进行的实验确定了特权升级、shell注入、内存和磁盘损坏以及高级拒绝服务攻击的多个可重复目标。由于所提出的rowhammer攻击注入(RAI)方法使用错误注入和统计抽样,因此RAI可以定量评估任何给定目标软件状态下建模的rowhammer攻击成功概率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Rowhammer Attack Injection Methodology
This paper presents a systematic methodology to identify and validate security attacks that exploit user influenceable hardware faults (i.e., rowhammer errors). We break down rowhammer attack procedures into nine generalized steps where some steps are designed to increase the attack success probabilities. Our framework can perform those nine operations (e.g., pressuring system memory and spraying landing pages) as well as inject rowhammer errors which are basically modeled as ≥3-bit errors. When one of the injected errors is activated, such can cause control or data flow divergences which can then be caught by a prepared landing page and thus lead to a successful attack. Our experiments conducted against a guest operating system of a typical cloud hypervisor identified multiple reproducible targets for privilege escalation, shell injection, memory and disk corruption, and advanced denial-of-service attacks. Because the presented rowhammer attack injection (RAI) methodology uses error injection and thus statistical sampling, RAI can quantitatively evaluate the modeled rowhammer attack success probabilities of any given target software states.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信