{"title":"在真理","authors":"T. Aquinas","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1ghv4cx.7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, “That is true which is seen”; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, “That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know,” for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: “That is true which is.” It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.","PeriodicalId":263295,"journal":{"name":"Reading Wiredu","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On Truth\",\"authors\":\"T. Aquinas\",\"doi\":\"10.2307/j.ctv1ghv4cx.7\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, “That is true which is seen”; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, “That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know,” for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: “That is true which is.” It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.\",\"PeriodicalId\":263295,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Reading Wiredu\",\"volume\":\"25 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-02-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Reading Wiredu\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1ghv4cx.7\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Reading Wiredu","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1ghv4cx.7","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, “That is true which is seen”; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, “That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know,” for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: “That is true which is.” It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.
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