作为去中心化金融市场基础设施的比特币治理

Hossein Nabilou
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引用次数: 14

摘要

比特币是所有加密货币中市值最高的最古老和最广泛建立的加密货币网络。尽管比特币(小写b)越来越被视为一种属于新资产类别的数字资产,但比特币网络(大写b)是一种去中心化的金融市场基础设施(dFMI),它在不依赖于传统金融市场基础设施(fmi)的情况下清算和结算其原生资产的交易。然而,要成为可靠的资产类别和dFMI,比特币需要有强大的治理安排;这些安排是内置于协议中(即链上治理机制)还是下放给比特币网络中的参与者(即链下治理机制),或者由两种机制的组合组成(即混合形式的治理)。本文研究比特币治理,重点关注其所谓的缺点。因此,在定义了比特币治理及其目标之后,本文提出了一种特殊的治理模型,其主要目标是维护和最大化比特币的主要价值主张,即其抗审查属性,允许参与者在社会信任最小的环境中进行交易。因此,比特币治理,包括解决比特币治理危机的过程,以及审查比特币改进建议(BIPs)的标准,应该根据比特币作为一种抗审查的价值储存和支付基础设施的普遍叙述来分析。在这样一个特殊的治理模型中,本文试图通过参考过去十年中对比特币构成严重威胁的主要治理危机来确定比特币治理的潜在缺陷。它的结论是,比特币网络中现有的治理安排在处理比特币的重大危机方面基本上是成功的,否则这些危机将成为比特币网络的生存威胁。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bitcoin Governance as a Decentralized Financial Market Infrastructure
Bitcoin is the oldest and most widely established cryptocurrency network with the highest market capitalization among all cryptocurrencies. Although bitcoin (with lowercase b) is increasingly viewed as a digital asset belonging to a new asset class, the Bitcoin network (with uppercase B) is a decentralized financial market infrastructure (dFMI) that clears and settles transactions in its native asset without relying on the conventional financial market infrastructures (FMIs). To be a reliable asset class as well as a dFMI, however, Bitcoin needs to have robust governance arrangements; whether such arrangements are built into the protocol (i.e., on-chain governance mechanisms) or relegated to the participants in the Bitcoin network (i.e., off-chain governance mechanisms), or are composed of a combination of both mechanisms (i.e., a hybrid form of governance). This paper studies Bitcoin governance with a focus on its alleged shortcomings. In so doing, after defining Bitcoin governance and its objectives, the paper puts forward an idiosyncratic governance model whose main objective is to preserve and maximize the main value proposition of Bitcoin, i.e., its censorship-resistant property, which allows participants to transact in an environment with minimum social trust. Therefore, Bitcoin governance, including the processes through which Bitcoin governance crises have been resolved and the standards against which the Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) are examined, should be analyzed in light of the prevailing narrative of Bitcoin as a censorship-resistant store of value and payment infrastructure. Within such a special governance model, this paper seeks to identify the potential shortcomings in Bitcoin governance by reference to the major governance crises that posed serious threats to Bitcoin in the last decade. It concludes that the existing governance arrangements in the Bitcoin network have been largely successful in dealing with Bitcoin’s major crises that would have otherwise become existential threats to the Bitcoin network.
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