政治腐败和有组织犯罪

J. Newell
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本章的出发点是,腐败通常涉及范围广泛的行动者之间的互动,包括调解员和第三方执法者,他们的工作是确保交易双方之间有足够的信任,使交易能够成功完成。这一章的重点是这些被称为“黑手党”的第三方执法者,因为他们提供暴力威胁,以确保一旦腐败交易所的各方同意做生意,这些条款实际上得到尊重。在某种程度上,它们提供了一些类似于法律合同世界中可用的保险单的东西,以保护公司和个人免受不遵守规定或不遵守规定的后果。它们也可以被视为类似于合法的债务催收公司或私人保安公司,不同之处在于,一旦他们的服务被雇用,他们就不能轻易被解雇。本章首先考察黑手党的特征,然后再考虑黑手党成功地将自己确立为能够提供保护和执行合同的强大实体的条件,这是黑手党的显著特征。然后详细讨论了黑手党和腐败之间的关系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Political corruption and organised crime
This chapter takes its point of departure from the fact that corruption typically involves the interaction of a wide range of actors – including mediators and third-party enforcers specialised in the job of ensuring a sufficient degree of trust between the counterparts to enable transactions to be concluded successfully. It is on these third-party enforcers – referred to as ‘mafias’ – that the chapter focusses, as they offer the threat of violence to ensure that, once the parties to a corrupt exchange have agreed to do business, the terms are actually respected. To that extent, they offer something analogous to the insurance policies available, in the world of legal contracts, to protect firms and individuals against non-compliance or the consequences of non-compliance. They might also be regarded as analogous to legal debt collection agencies or private security firms, the difference being that once their services have been engaged, they cannot easily be dismissed. The chapter begins by looking at the characteristics of mafias, before considering the conditions under which they succeed in establishing themselves as powerful entities able to offer the protection and contract enforcement that are their distinguishing features. It then considers the relationship between mafias and corruption in some detail.
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