基于演化博弈的融资平台监管机制研究

Wu Yingjing, Wang Yufan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着融资平台问题的频繁发生,对融资平台的监管迫在眉睫。本文选择演化博弈方法,考虑由政府和融资平台组成的博弈模型。研究发现,政府和融资平台的决策是相互影响的,但仅依靠平台自身的约束很难控制平台的风险。在一定程度上,政府对平台的监管可以降低平台审计带来的风险。这个电子文档是一个“活的”模板,它已经在样式表中定义了论文的组成部分[标题,正文,标题等]。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Study on Supervision Mechanism of Financing Platform Based on Evolutionary Game
With the frequent occurrence of financing platform problems, the supervision of financing platform is imminent. This paper chooses the evolutionary game method and considers the game model composed of government and financing platform. The research finds that the decision-making of government and financing platform affects each other, but it is difficult to control the risk of platform only depending on the constraints of platform itself. To some extent, the government's supervision of the platform can reduce the risks caused by platform auditing. This electronic document is a “live” template and already defines the components of your paper [title, text, heads, etc.] in its style sheet.
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