就应对气候变化的有效机制进行谈判

C. Gollier, J. Tirole
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引用次数: 103

摘要

在环境问题上,由于缺乏集体行动而产生的搭便车现象由于担心泄漏和希望在今后的谈判中得到赔偿而更加严重。占主导地位的“承诺和审查”缓解方法将提供吸引人的承诺和更新的胜利声明,只会延长等待的游戏。气候变化全球公地问题只有通过统一的碳定价才能得到解决。我们讨论了谈判进程的路线图。谈判代表必须回到基本问题上来:各国需要统一的碳定价,需要核查,需要各国愿意承诺的治理程序。每个国家在分配其国内的努力时将享有辅助性。我们建议建立一个以财政和贸易惩罚为基础的执行方案,以促使所有国家参与和遵守协定。最后,在经济方法之间的选择,无论是碳价格承诺还是限额与交易,都需要权衡取舍,在此基础上,各种合理的观点可能并存。我们将讨论为什么我们个人支持国际总量控制与交易协议的监控原因。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Negotiating effective institutions against climate change
In environmental matters, the free riding generated by the lack of collective action is aggravated by concerns about leakages and by the desire to receive compensation in future negotiations. The dominant "pledge and review" approach to mitigation will deliver appealing promises and renewed victory statements, only to prolong the waiting game. The climate change global commons problem will be solved only through coherent carbon pricing. We discuss the roadmap for the negotiation process. Negotiators must return to the fundamentals: the need for uniform carbon pricing across countries, for verification, and for a governance process to which countries would commit. Each country would enjoy subsidiarity in its allocation of efforts within the country. We suggest an enforcement scheme based on financial and trade penalties to induce all countries to participate and comply with the agreement. Finally, the choice among economic approaches, whether a carbon price commitment or a cap-and-trade, is subject to trade-offs, on which alternative reasonable views may co-exist. We discuss monitoring reasons for why we personally favor an international cap-and-trade agreement.
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