现代合谋犯罪制度

S. Morrison
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引用次数: 0

摘要

与之前的版本相比,美国现代犯罪阴谋法体系发生了一些变化。本文探讨了这一变化,认为现代阴谋犯罪制度赋予了政府很大的自由裁量权来指控和证明阴谋,以至于不受欢迎的观点和表达这些观点的言论已经成为起诉的现成对象。本文的核心是对现代阴谋法制度的界定,这是一种统一性而非动态性的制度。在动态法律体系包含执行不同任务的不同组成部分(例如,证明真实行为和故意)的情况下,统一的共谋法体系几乎允许所有类型的证据被采纳,以证明所有共谋要素,几乎不存在证据和宪法规则来限制这种接纳。其结果是忽略了旨在确保结果可靠性和个人权利的重要规范、宪法和证据规则。这篇文章提供了一个阴谋法的历史,说明了法律的定性和定量扩展到它的现代迭代。这段历史始于1285年的英格兰,当时共谋仅限于达成协议,虚假起诉他人,只有受害者被起诉并无罪释放时才会被起诉。我把这种类型的阴谋称为具体的结果主义。在随后的演变过程中,法律变得我所说的一般,因为它适用于任何犯罪的协议和义务论,因为实质性目标犯罪不再需要实现-阴谋本身脱离了其事实背景和犯罪。18世纪和19世纪的霍金斯和丹曼学说为阴谋引入了道德层面——谴责旨在“不法”行为和犯罪行为的协议。最终的结果是统一的现代阴谋体系。本文还提出了应对阴谋的制度统一性的四项规范改革。这些改革是基于现行的关于阴谋、叛国罪的法律,以及第一修正案,因为言论是主要的证据类型。这些改革旨在为司法体系创造活力,既要服务于准确的结果,又要服务于被告的权利。理解当前的犯罪阴谋体系是很重要的,因为它在起诉中广泛使用,而且越来越多的人认为,法律针对的是不受欢迎的想法和言论,会产生错误的结果。现在比以往任何时候都更有必要对犯罪阴谋制度进行改革,以确保合法的刑事司法制度保护个人权利并确保可靠的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The System of Modern Criminal Conspiracy
Something has changed in the modern system of American criminal conspiracy law compared to its prior iterations. This article explores that change, arguing that the system of modern criminal conspiracy now gives to the government such great discretion to charge and prove a conspiracy that unpopular ideas and the speech that expresses them have become ready subjects of prosecution.At its center, this article defines the system of modern conspiracy law, which is one of uniformity rather than dynamism. Where dynamic systems of law contain distinct components that perform different tasks (proving actus reus and mens rea, for example), the uniform system of conspiracy law permits virtually all types of evidence to be admitted to prove all of conspiracy’s elements, with almost nonexistent evidentiary and constitutional rules to limit this admission. The result is elision of important normative, constitutional, and evidentiary rules designed to ensure both outcome reliability and individuals’ rights.This article provides a history of conspiracy law that illustrates the law’s qualitative and quantitative expansion toward its modern iteration. That history begins in 1285 England, when conspiracy was limited to agreements to falsely prosecute another and could be charged only where the victim was in fact prosecuted and acquitted. I call this type of conspiracy specific and consequentialist. During its subsequent evolution, the law became what I call general in that it applied to agreements to commit any crime whatsoever and deontological because the substantive target crime no longer had to have been achieved — the conspiracy itself became unmoored from its factual context and a crime. The 18th and 19th century Hawkins and Denman doctrines introduced a moral aspect to conspiracy — condemning agreements that aimed at “wrongful” conduct as much as criminal conduct. The ultimate result was the uniform system of modern conspiracy.This article also provides four normative reforms that respond to conspiracy’s systemic uniformity. These reforms are grounded in extant law on conspiracy, treason, and, because speech is the primary type of proof, First Amendment law. These reforms are meant to create dynamism in the system, which should serve both accurate outcomes and defendants’ rights.It is important to understand the current system of criminal conspiracy both because of its pervasive use in prosecutions and the growing consensus that the law targets unpopular ideas and speech and produces erroneous outcomes. Now more than ever, reforms to the system of criminal conspiracy are necessary to ensure a legitimate criminal justice system that protects individual rights and ensures reliable outcomes.
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