私人期权呢?

Jon D. Michaels
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如今,人们对公共选择有着相当大的热情,尤其是在医疗保健和银行业。公共选择是完全私人的商业条款和完全官僚的、税收和转移的政府条款之间的妥协,旨在为公民消费者提供更多的选择和保护。在将市场秩序和国家福利相结合(而不是在两者之间进行选择)的过程中,政府机构正在尝试公共选择,这是在走出他们的主权通道,放弃立法和监管工具,转而采用商业工具。在公共选择方面已经有很多深思熟虑的工作。出于这个原因,本文将注意力转向相反的现象——即私人选择。正如公共选择涉及政府使用商业而非主权途径来补救市场失灵一样,私人选择涉及公司(或员工群体)采用主权而非商业姿态来补救政府失灵。私人的,类似主权的干预是指以下一种或多种:私人行为者(1)利用民主途径和审议程序来推进某些公共政策;(2)承担现代自由民主国家不再愿意或无法指导或资助的实质性责任;或者(3)主要为一般福利提供的方式表明,他们可能会自愿地将外部性内部化,承担一些利润损失或法律风险,并减少而不是利用权力和信息不对称。这种准主权的私人选择包括Facebook提议的数字货币,以及其自封的最高法院,其任务是就用户和广告商的内容做出裁决。它们还包括苹果(Apple)和谷歌(Google)计划对老派公司小镇进行管理,从许多方面来说,这是21世纪的翻版。我们甚至可以超越高管层,考虑那些正在形成自己私人选择的员工,从而在商业上类似于整体政治。具体来说,工人因其公司参与在政治上和法律上都有问题的政府项目而罢工,也可能构成私人选择。这些工人抗议不是为了提高自己的工资和福利。相反,当美国选民(由于结构性原因)无法民主地影响美国的移民或国防政策时,他们是在冒着自己的经济安全风险来代表美国选民。本文深入探讨了私人选择,确定了它们的定义特征,解释了它们如何应对当今严重的政府失灵,并将它们在政府、市场机构和参与者组成的更大生态系统中的作用置于背景下。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What about Private Options?
There is considerable enthusiasm today for public options, particularly in the health care and banking sectors. A compromise between entirely private commercial provision and wholly bureaucratic, tax-and-transfer government provision, public options are designed to offer citizen-consumers greater choice and protection. In blending (rather than choosing between) market ordering and state welfare, government agencies experimenting with public options are stepping out of their sovereign lane, forgoing legislative and regulatory tools in favor of commercial ones. Plenty of thoughtful work on public options already exists. For that reason, this Essay turns its attention to the converse phenomenon—namely, private options. Just as public options involve governments using commercial—not sovereign—pathways to remedy market failures, private options involve firms (or groups of employees) adopting sovereign—not commercial—postures to remedy government failures. Private, sovereign-like interventions refer to one or more of the following: private actors (1) utilizing democratic pathways and deliberative procedures in furtherance of some public policy; (2) taking on substantive responsibilities that modern liberal democracies are no longer willing or able to direct or fund; or (3) providing principally for the general welfare in ways that suggest they may be voluntarily internalizing externalities, at some profit loss or legal risk, and reducing rather than exploiting power and information asymmetries. Private options of this quasi-sovereign variety include such things as Facebook’s proposed digital currency and its self-styled supreme court tasked with rendering adjudicatory decisions as to user and advertiser content. They also include Apple and Google’s planned stewardship over what are in many respects twenty-first century reboots of old-school company towns. We may even look beyond the C-suite and consider workforces that are fashioning their own private options, and thus functioning as commercial analogs to the body politic. Specifically, worker strikes over their companies’ participation in politically and legally questionable government programs may likewise constitute private options. These workers are not protesting to augment their own wages and benefits. To the contrary, they are risking their own financial security to stand in for the American electorate when that electorate is (for structural reasons) unable to democratically influence U.S. immigration or defense policy. This Essay drills down on private options, identifying their defining characteristics, explaining how they respond to today’s serious government failures, and contextualizing their role within the larger ecosystem of government and market institutions and actors.
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