{"title":"语义观、经验充分性及其应用","authors":"M. Suárez","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2005.449","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"It is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of science that the domain of application of a theory is typically larger than its explanatory covering power: theories can be applied to phenomena that they do not explain. I argue for an analogous thesis regarding the notion of empirical adequacy. A theory’s domain of application is typically larger than its domain of empirical adequacy: theories are often applied to phenomena from which they receive no empirical confirmation.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"58 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2005-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"20","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Semantic View, Empirical Adequacy, and Application\",\"authors\":\"M. Suárez\",\"doi\":\"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2005.449\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"It is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of science that the domain of application of a theory is typically larger than its explanatory covering power: theories can be applied to phenomena that they do not explain. I argue for an analogous thesis regarding the notion of empirical adequacy. A theory’s domain of application is typically larger than its domain of empirical adequacy: theories are often applied to phenomena from which they receive no empirical confirmation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":117174,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)\",\"volume\":\"58 3\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2005-12-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"20\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2005.449\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2005.449","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Semantic View, Empirical Adequacy, and Application
It is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of science that the domain of application of a theory is typically larger than its explanatory covering power: theories can be applied to phenomena that they do not explain. I argue for an analogous thesis regarding the notion of empirical adequacy. A theory’s domain of application is typically larger than its domain of empirical adequacy: theories are often applied to phenomena from which they receive no empirical confirmation.
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