比较恶意软件样本拆封:可行性研究

Ryoichi Isawa, M. Morii, D. Inoue
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引用次数: 2

摘要

当分析人员检查恶意软件的二进制文件以获得一些用于防御和缓解的有用信息时,通常需要首先提取其原始二进制文件。包装是原因。通常,恶意软件作者打包(加密和/或压缩)他们的恶意软件来阻碍代码分析,这使得分析人员有必要花费大量时间来解包。为了有效地分析恶意软件,本文提出了一种称为OEPdet的自动原始入口点检测器。如果在恶意软件执行后找到了恶意软件的原始入口点(OEP),那么分析人员可以顺利地从OEP开始检查原始二进制文件。OEPdet将两个恶意软件样本作为输入,以查找这些样本之间共享的原始二进制文件的一部分。然后,它根据共享二进制文件检测OEP。这是基于这样一个事实,即许多恶意软件样本通常是用各种源代码生成的,这些源代码在功能或代码片段粒度上与他人共享。通过对恶意软件样本的实验,验证了OEPdet检测OEP的可行性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Comparing Malware Samples for Unpacking: A Feasibility Study
When an analyst examines the binary of malware to obtain some useful information for defense and mitigation, she is often required to extract its original binary first. Packing is the reason of this. Usually, malware authors pack (encrypt and/or compress) their malware to hinder code analysis, making it necessary for analysts to spend a great deal of time on unpacking. Towards effective malware analysis, this paper presents an automated original-entry-point detector called OEPdet. If the original entry point (OEP) of malware is found after the malware is executed, an analyst can smoothly begin to examine the original binary starting at the OEP. OEPdet takes as input two malware samples to find part of the original binary shared between those samples. It then detects the OEP based on that shared binary. This is based on the fact that many malware samples are often generated with a variety of source code shared with others at function or snippet granularity. The experiments using some malware samples confirm OEPdet is feasible to detect the OEP.
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