联邦学习培训服务市场的动态博弈

Y. Zou, Shaohan Feng, Jing Xu, Shimin Gong, D. Niyato, W. Cheng
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引用次数: 5

摘要

随着深度学习的巨大成功和移动设备的日益强大,联邦学习越来越受到学术界和工业界的关注。它提供高质量的设备模型培训服务,同时保护数据隐私。在本文中,我们考虑了一个由模型所有者作为消费者和移动设备组作为提供者组成的联邦学习培训服务市场。建立了一个两层动态博弈模型来分析这个市场的动态。其中,模型所有者的服务选择过程被建模为低级进化博弈,而移动设备群体的定价策略被建模为高级差分博弈。对动态博弈即动态均衡的解进行了理论分析,并通过大量的数值计算进行了验证。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Dynamic Games in Federated Learning Training Service Market
With the great success of deep learning and increasingly powerful mobile devices, federated learning gains growing attentions from both academia and industry. It provides high-quality on-device model training services while preserves data privacy. In this paper, we consider a federated learning training service market which consists of model owners as consumers and mobile device groups as providers. A two-layer dynamic game is formulated to analyze the dynamics of this market. In particular, the service selection processes of model owners are modeled as a lower-level evolutionary game while the pricing strategies of mobile device groups are modeled as a higher-level differential game. The solutions of the dynamic games, i.e., dynamic equilibrium are analyzed theoretically and verified via extensive numerical evaluations.
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