René M. Stulz, James G. Tompkins, Rohan Williamson, Z. Ye
{"title":"银行董事会为什么要设立风险委员会?","authors":"René M. Stulz, James G. Tompkins, Rohan Williamson, Z. Ye","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3893882","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a risk committee before the Dodd-Frank Act forced bank holding companies with assets in excess of $10 billion to have a board risk committee, and (2) establishing a board risk committee does not reduce a bank’s risk on average. Using unique interview data, we show that the work of risk committees is consistent with our theory in part.","PeriodicalId":306152,"journal":{"name":"Risk Management eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why Do Bank Boards Have Risk Committees?\",\"authors\":\"René M. Stulz, James G. Tompkins, Rohan Williamson, Z. Ye\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3893882\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a risk committee before the Dodd-Frank Act forced bank holding companies with assets in excess of $10 billion to have a board risk committee, and (2) establishing a board risk committee does not reduce a bank’s risk on average. Using unique interview data, we show that the work of risk committees is consistent with our theory in part.\",\"PeriodicalId\":306152,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Risk Management eJournal\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Risk Management eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3893882\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Risk Management eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3893882","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a risk committee before the Dodd-Frank Act forced bank holding companies with assets in excess of $10 billion to have a board risk committee, and (2) establishing a board risk committee does not reduce a bank’s risk on average. Using unique interview data, we show that the work of risk committees is consistent with our theory in part.