举报有偿欺诈:我能信任你吗?

Cynthia P. Guthrie, E. Taylor
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引用次数: 34

摘要

摘要:美国证券交易委员会(SEC)举报人赏金计划在增加外部举报非法行为方面的有效性表明,雇主可能会通过提供金钱奖励来增加内部举报。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Whistleblowing on Fraud for Pay: Can I Trust You?
ABSTRACT: The SEC whistleblower bounty program's effectiveness in increasing external reports of illegal acts suggests that employers might increase internal whistleblowing by offering monetary awa...
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