{"title":"中央情报局的民主诚信:信息共享和选举责任","authors":"Graham Streich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3442338","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Drawing from previous research on the political business cycle and principal-agent theory on executive and congressional oversight of information sharing, I analyze the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) during presidential and congressional elections. I find that when the the incumbent president is democrat the CIA responds to FOIA requests approximately a month faster than when the incumbent president is a republican (p<0.20).","PeriodicalId":166493,"journal":{"name":"Legislation & Statutory Interpretation eJournal","volume":"140 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The CIA's Democratic Integrity: Information Sharing and Electoral Accountability\",\"authors\":\"Graham Streich\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3442338\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Drawing from previous research on the political business cycle and principal-agent theory on executive and congressional oversight of information sharing, I analyze the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) during presidential and congressional elections. I find that when the the incumbent president is democrat the CIA responds to FOIA requests approximately a month faster than when the incumbent president is a republican (p<0.20).\",\"PeriodicalId\":166493,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Legislation & Statutory Interpretation eJournal\",\"volume\":\"140 3\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-05-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Legislation & Statutory Interpretation eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3442338\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Legislation & Statutory Interpretation eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3442338","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The CIA's Democratic Integrity: Information Sharing and Electoral Accountability
Drawing from previous research on the political business cycle and principal-agent theory on executive and congressional oversight of information sharing, I analyze the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) during presidential and congressional elections. I find that when the the incumbent president is democrat the CIA responds to FOIA requests approximately a month faster than when the incumbent president is a republican (p<0.20).
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