{"title":"社会困境博弈中具有第三方认可的同伴惩罚","authors":"Fangfang Tan, Erte Xiao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1945211","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.","PeriodicalId":372228,"journal":{"name":"Corrections & Sentencing Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"2 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game\",\"authors\":\"Fangfang Tan, Erte Xiao\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1945211\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.\",\"PeriodicalId\":372228,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corrections & Sentencing Law & Policy eJournal\",\"volume\":\"2 9\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corrections & Sentencing Law & Policy eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1945211\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corrections & Sentencing Law & Policy eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1945211","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game
In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.
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