股东诉讼的阴暗面:来自企业收购的证据

IF 2.9 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-01-18 DOI:10.1111/fima.12342

Yongqiang Chu, Yijia (Eddie) Zhao

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引用次数: 0

摘要

利用1989年至2005年间23个州交错采用的普遍要求法(UD)使得提交股东衍生诉讼变得更加困难，我们表明诉讼威胁的减少提高了公司收购效率。使用差异中的差异方法，我们发现并购方在并购后获得了更高的公告回报和更好的并购后运营绩效。进一步分析表明，收购方为了避免诉讼而做出次优并购决策。综上所述，我们表明诉讼风险会扭曲管理者的激励，并在事前破坏价值。

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The dark side of shareholder litigation: Evidence from corporate takeovers

Exploiting staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws by 23 states between 1989 and 2005 that makes filing shareholder derivative litigations more difficult, we show that reduced litigation threats improve corporate takeover efficiency. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that acquirers experience higher announcement returns and better postmerger operating performance after the UD laws. Further analysis suggests that acquirers make suboptimal merger decisions to avoid litigation. Taken together, we show that litigation risk can distort managers’ incentives and destroy value ex ante.

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来源期刊

Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

6.00

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Financial Management (FM) serves both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of nonfinancial businesses, financial institutions, and public or private not-for-profit organizations.