目标二:一个常规化的实验室现场实验。

IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Giuseppe Attanasi, Massimo Egidi, Elena Manzoni
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文通过在意大利第20届群众集会节(“La Notte della Taranta”)上进行的现场实验室实验,调查了常规化和创造力的认知决定因素。实验对象反复玩“目标-二”游戏的解谜版本(32手)。在1-16手牌中,给定牌分布的最佳策略总是相同的,并且是最容易发现的。相反,在17-32手牌中,受试者所接触的游戏中,最佳情境策略可能与他们所熟悉的策略不同。我们调查在17-32手中,受试者是否以及如何保持熟悉策略的常规,或创造性地选择不同的策略。我们将在绝大多数情况下使用最佳情境策略的受试者定义为“专家”。在17-32手牌中,我们发现有几个实验对象在玩熟悉的策略,即使这不是最佳策略,不管他们是否是专家。这表明,常规化在个体认知过程中根深蒂固。此外,常规化只对不专业的受试者有效:有创造力的不专业受试者速度较慢,他们无法在多个手中找到最佳情境策略。相反,在专家型受试者中,创造性受试者虽然速度仍然较慢,但在找到最佳情境策略时,需要的动作比常规受试者少。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Target-the-Two: a lab-in-the-field experiment on routinization.

Target-the-Two: a lab-in-the-field experiment on routinization.

Target-the-Two: a lab-in-the-field experiment on routinization.

Target-the-Two: a lab-in-the-field experiment on routinization.

The paper investigates the cognitive determinants of routinization and creativity by means of a lab-in-the-field experiment run at the 20th edition of a mass gathering festival in Italy ("La Notte della Taranta"). Subjects play repeatedly the puzzle version of the Target-The-Two game (32 hands). In hands 1-16, the strategy that is optimal given the card distribution is always the same and it is the easiest to be discovered. Conversely, in hands 17-32, subjects are exposed to games where the optimal contextual strategy may differ from the one with which they have been made familiar. We investigate whether and how, in hands 17-32, subjects remain routinized on the familiar strategy, or creatively choose a different one. We define as "experts" those subjects who played the optimal contextual strategy in the overwhelming majority of hands 1-16. In hands 17-32, we find several subjects playing the familiar strategy even when it is not the optimal one, regardless of whether they are experts or not. This shows that routinization is deep-rooted in the cognitive individual process. Furthermore, routinization pays off only for inexpert subjects: creative inexpert subjects are slower and they fail to find the optimal contextual strategy in several hands. Among expert subjects instead, creative subjects, although still slower, need less moves than routinized ones to find the optimal contextual strategy.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
5.60%
发文量
39
期刊介绍: The journal aims to provide an international forum for a new approach to economics. Following the tradition of Joseph A. Schumpeter, it is designed to focus on original research with an evolutionary conception of the economy. The journal will publish articles with a strong emphasis on dynamics, changing structures (including technologies, institutions, beliefs and behaviours) and disequilibrium processes with an evolutionary perspective (innovation, selection, imitation, etc.). It favours interdisciplinary analysis and is devoted to theoretical, methodological and applied work. Research areas include: industrial dynamics; multi-sectoral and cross-country studies of productivity; innovations and new technologies; dynamic competition and structural change in a national and international context; causes and effects of technological, political and social changes; cyclic processes in economic evolution; the role of governments in a dynamic world; modelling complex dynamic economic systems; application of concepts, such as self-organization, bifurcation, and chaos theory to economics; evolutionary games. Officially cited as: J Evol Econ
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