{"title":"早期现代精神病学的本质主义。","authors":"Hein van den Berg","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00562-x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Are psychiatric disorders natural kinds? This question has received a lot of attention within present-day philosophy of psychiatry, where many authors debate the ontology and nature of mental disorders. Similarly, historians of psychiatry, dating back to Foucault, have debated whether psychiatric researchers conceived of mental disorders as natural kinds or not. However, historians of psychiatry have paid little to no attention to the influence of (a) theories within logic, and (b) theories within metaphysics on psychiatric accounts of proper method, and on accounts of the nature and classification of mental disorders. Historically, however, logic and metaphysics have extensively shaped methods and interpretations of classifications in the natural sciences. This paper corrects this lacuna in the history of psychiatry, and demonstrates that theories within logic and metaphysics, articulated by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), have significantly shaped the conception of medical method and (psychiatric) nosology of the influential nosologist Boissier De Sauvages (1706-1767). After treating Sauvages, I discuss the method of the influential nosologist William Cullen (1710-1790), and demonstrate the continuity between the classificatory methods of Sauvages and Cullen. I show that both Sauvages and Cullen were essentialists concerning medical diseases in general and psychiatric disorders in particular, contributing to the history of conceptions of the ontology and nature of mental disorders.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 2","pages":"12"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10033471/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The essentialism of early modern psychiatric nosology.\",\"authors\":\"Hein van den Berg\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s40656-023-00562-x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Are psychiatric disorders natural kinds? This question has received a lot of attention within present-day philosophy of psychiatry, where many authors debate the ontology and nature of mental disorders. Similarly, historians of psychiatry, dating back to Foucault, have debated whether psychiatric researchers conceived of mental disorders as natural kinds or not. However, historians of psychiatry have paid little to no attention to the influence of (a) theories within logic, and (b) theories within metaphysics on psychiatric accounts of proper method, and on accounts of the nature and classification of mental disorders. Historically, however, logic and metaphysics have extensively shaped methods and interpretations of classifications in the natural sciences. This paper corrects this lacuna in the history of psychiatry, and demonstrates that theories within logic and metaphysics, articulated by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), have significantly shaped the conception of medical method and (psychiatric) nosology of the influential nosologist Boissier De Sauvages (1706-1767). After treating Sauvages, I discuss the method of the influential nosologist William Cullen (1710-1790), and demonstrate the continuity between the classificatory methods of Sauvages and Cullen. I show that both Sauvages and Cullen were essentialists concerning medical diseases in general and psychiatric disorders in particular, contributing to the history of conceptions of the ontology and nature of mental disorders.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":56308,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences\",\"volume\":\"45 2\",\"pages\":\"12\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10033471/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00562-x\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00562-x","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
精神疾病是自然的吗?这个问题在当今的精神病学哲学中受到了很多关注,许多作者都在争论精神障碍的本体论和本质。同样,从福柯开始的精神病学历史学家也一直在争论,精神病学研究人员是否将精神障碍视为一种自然类型。然而,精神病学的历史学家很少或根本没有注意到(a)逻辑学中的理论,(b)形而上学中的理论对精神病学对正确方法的解释,以及对精神障碍的性质和分类的解释的影响。然而,在历史上,逻辑学和形而上学广泛地塑造了自然科学分类的方法和解释。本文纠正了精神病学历史上的这一空白,并证明了由克里斯蒂安·沃尔夫(Christian Wolff, 1679-1754)阐述的逻辑学和形而上学中的理论,极大地塑造了有影响力的病毒学家布瓦西尔·德·索瓦什(Boissier De Sauvages, 1706-1767)的医学方法和(精神病学)疾病分类学的概念。在治疗Sauvages之后,我讨论了有影响力的病毒学家William Cullen(1710-1790)的方法,并证明了Sauvages和Cullen的分类方法之间的连续性。我表明,索维奇和卡伦都是一般医学疾病的本质主义者,特别是精神疾病,对精神疾病的本体论和本质的概念的历史做出了贡献。
The essentialism of early modern psychiatric nosology.
Are psychiatric disorders natural kinds? This question has received a lot of attention within present-day philosophy of psychiatry, where many authors debate the ontology and nature of mental disorders. Similarly, historians of psychiatry, dating back to Foucault, have debated whether psychiatric researchers conceived of mental disorders as natural kinds or not. However, historians of psychiatry have paid little to no attention to the influence of (a) theories within logic, and (b) theories within metaphysics on psychiatric accounts of proper method, and on accounts of the nature and classification of mental disorders. Historically, however, logic and metaphysics have extensively shaped methods and interpretations of classifications in the natural sciences. This paper corrects this lacuna in the history of psychiatry, and demonstrates that theories within logic and metaphysics, articulated by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), have significantly shaped the conception of medical method and (psychiatric) nosology of the influential nosologist Boissier De Sauvages (1706-1767). After treating Sauvages, I discuss the method of the influential nosologist William Cullen (1710-1790), and demonstrate the continuity between the classificatory methods of Sauvages and Cullen. I show that both Sauvages and Cullen were essentialists concerning medical diseases in general and psychiatric disorders in particular, contributing to the history of conceptions of the ontology and nature of mental disorders.
期刊介绍:
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences is an interdisciplinary journal committed to providing an integrative approach to understanding the life sciences. It welcomes submissions from historians, philosophers, biologists, physicians, ethicists and scholars in the social studies of science. Contributors are expected to offer broad and interdisciplinary perspectives on the development of biology, biomedicine and related fields, especially as these perspectives illuminate the foundations, development, and/or implications of scientific practices and related developments. Submissions which are collaborative and feature different disciplinary approaches are especially encouraged, as are submissions written by senior and junior scholars (including graduate students).