{"title":"精神损害索赔、尊严侵权与合理敏感性的医疗法律虚构。","authors":"Alessandra Suuberg","doi":"","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Can individuals with a highly sensitive temperament recover in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)? In 2019, an article in the University of Memphis Law Review raised this question, referring to the \"Highly Sensitive Person\" (HSP) construct in psychology and asking whether the IIED tort's 'reasonable person' standard discriminates against highly sensitive plaintiffs. Following up on that discussion, the present article considers how the law of IIED has historically treated plaintiffs with diagnosed psychiatric vulnerabilities that are either known or unknown to the defendant. The article also extends this discussion to the law's treatment of temperaments, such as high sensitivity, which are distinct from diagnosed psychiatric disorders; presents hypothetical scenarios with respect to undiagnosed but inferred or predicted vulnerabilities; and explores the history of the dignitary IIED tort and the origins of its reasonableness requirement. This discussion acknowledges that scientific advances can allow uniquely vulnerable plaintiffs to assert harm in new ways--while also (1) pointing out that scientific uncertainties regarding the mind and temperamental sensitivity persist today and (2) touching on clinical and criminal law approaches to intentionally inflicted harms, which can emphasize the defendant's conduct as opposed to the plaintiff's subjective traits or experience for victim-protecting reasons. The purpose of raising these considerations is not to suggest particular reforms or strategies but, rather, to encourage readers to consider the potential impact of focusing on the plaintiff's biology on the one hand, or the defendant's conduct on the other, when deciding how to remedy intentionally inflicted mental harms.</p>","PeriodicalId":73804,"journal":{"name":"Journal of law and health","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Emotional Distress Claims, Dignitary Torts, and the Medical-Legal Fiction of Reasonable Sensitivity.\",\"authors\":\"Alessandra Suuberg\",\"doi\":\"\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Can individuals with a highly sensitive temperament recover in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)? In 2019, an article in the University of Memphis Law Review raised this question, referring to the \\\"Highly Sensitive Person\\\" (HSP) construct in psychology and asking whether the IIED tort's 'reasonable person' standard discriminates against highly sensitive plaintiffs. Following up on that discussion, the present article considers how the law of IIED has historically treated plaintiffs with diagnosed psychiatric vulnerabilities that are either known or unknown to the defendant. The article also extends this discussion to the law's treatment of temperaments, such as high sensitivity, which are distinct from diagnosed psychiatric disorders; presents hypothetical scenarios with respect to undiagnosed but inferred or predicted vulnerabilities; and explores the history of the dignitary IIED tort and the origins of its reasonableness requirement. This discussion acknowledges that scientific advances can allow uniquely vulnerable plaintiffs to assert harm in new ways--while also (1) pointing out that scientific uncertainties regarding the mind and temperamental sensitivity persist today and (2) touching on clinical and criminal law approaches to intentionally inflicted harms, which can emphasize the defendant's conduct as opposed to the plaintiff's subjective traits or experience for victim-protecting reasons. The purpose of raising these considerations is not to suggest particular reforms or strategies but, rather, to encourage readers to consider the potential impact of focusing on the plaintiff's biology on the one hand, or the defendant's conduct on the other, when deciding how to remedy intentionally inflicted mental harms.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":73804,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of law and health\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of law and health\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of law and health","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
具有高度敏感气质的个体是否可以因故意造成情绪困扰(IIED)而获得侵权赔偿?2019年,《孟菲斯大学法律评论》(University of Memphis Law Review)的一篇文章提出了这个问题,文中提到了心理学中的“高度敏感者”(HSP)概念,并质疑IIED侵权行为的“理性人”标准是否歧视高度敏感的原告。在这一讨论的基础上,本文考虑了IIED法律在历史上是如何对待被告已知或未知的被诊断为精神脆弱的原告的。文章还将这一讨论扩展到法律对气质的治疗,例如与诊断的精神疾病不同的高敏感性;提供关于未诊断但推断或预测的漏洞的假设情景;并探讨了权贵ied侵权的历史及其合理性要求的渊源。这一讨论承认,科学的进步可以允许独特的弱势原告以新的方式主张伤害——同时也(1)指出,关于心理和气质敏感性的科学不确定性今天仍然存在;(2)触及临床和刑法方法来故意造成伤害,这可以强调被告的行为,而不是原告的主观特征或经验,出于保护受害者的原因。提出这些考虑的目的并不是建议具体的改革或策略,而是鼓励读者在决定如何补救故意造成的精神伤害时,考虑一方面关注原告的生理,或另一方面关注被告的行为的潜在影响。
Emotional Distress Claims, Dignitary Torts, and the Medical-Legal Fiction of Reasonable Sensitivity.
Can individuals with a highly sensitive temperament recover in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)? In 2019, an article in the University of Memphis Law Review raised this question, referring to the "Highly Sensitive Person" (HSP) construct in psychology and asking whether the IIED tort's 'reasonable person' standard discriminates against highly sensitive plaintiffs. Following up on that discussion, the present article considers how the law of IIED has historically treated plaintiffs with diagnosed psychiatric vulnerabilities that are either known or unknown to the defendant. The article also extends this discussion to the law's treatment of temperaments, such as high sensitivity, which are distinct from diagnosed psychiatric disorders; presents hypothetical scenarios with respect to undiagnosed but inferred or predicted vulnerabilities; and explores the history of the dignitary IIED tort and the origins of its reasonableness requirement. This discussion acknowledges that scientific advances can allow uniquely vulnerable plaintiffs to assert harm in new ways--while also (1) pointing out that scientific uncertainties regarding the mind and temperamental sensitivity persist today and (2) touching on clinical and criminal law approaches to intentionally inflicted harms, which can emphasize the defendant's conduct as opposed to the plaintiff's subjective traits or experience for victim-protecting reasons. The purpose of raising these considerations is not to suggest particular reforms or strategies but, rather, to encourage readers to consider the potential impact of focusing on the plaintiff's biology on the one hand, or the defendant's conduct on the other, when deciding how to remedy intentionally inflicted mental harms.