A stackelberg differential game theoretic approach for analyzing coordination strategies in a supply chain with retailer’s premium store brand

IF 4.4 3区管理学 Q1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Annals of Operations Research Pub Date : 2023-05-26 DOI:10.1007/s10479-023-05372-9

Parisa Assarzadegan, Seyed Reza Hejazi, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki

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Abstract

The present study examines a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer produces a product with a national brand (NB) and the retailer selling both the NB product and his own premium store brand (PSB) product. The manufacturer competes with the retailer through improving the quality by using innovation over time. It is assumed that both advertising and enhanced quality play positive roles in customers’ loyalty over time for the NB product. We propose four scenarios, including: (1) Decentralized (D), (2) Centralized (C), (3) Coordination with a revenue-sharing contract (RSH), and (4) Coordination with a two-part tariff contract (TPT). A Stackelberg differential game model is developed, and parametric analyses and managerial insights are provided based on a numerical example. Our results show that: (1) Introducing a PSB product alongside selling the NB product is profitable for the retailer, (2) In Scenario D and RSH, the manufacturer tries to increase the quality gap with the PSB product through innovation, (3) Customers’ loyalty leads to higher prices, levels of innovation, quality, and advertising for the NB product, (4) The TPT contract can lead to perfect coordination and yield higher profits for the manufacturer and the retailer.

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一种stackelberg微分博弈论方法，用于分析具有零售商高级商店品牌的供应链中的协调策略。

本研究考察了由制造商和零售商组成的供应链。制造商生产具有国家品牌（NB）的产品，零售商销售NB产品和他自己的高级商店品牌（PSB）产品。随着时间的推移，制造商通过使用创新来提高质量，从而与零售商竞争。人们认为，随着时间的推移，广告和提高质量对客户对NB产品的忠诚度都起着积极作用。我们提出了四种场景，包括：（1）去中心化（D），（2）集中化（C），（3）与收入共享合同（RSH）的协调，以及（4）与由两部分组成的关税合同（TPT）的协调。建立了Stackelberg微分对策模型，并通过一个算例进行了参数分析和管理启示。我们的研究结果表明：（1）在销售NB产品的同时引入PSB产品对零售商来说是有利可图的；（2）在场景D和RSH中，制造商试图通过创新来扩大与PSB产品的质量差距；（3）客户的忠诚度导致NB产品的价格、创新水平、质量和广告水平更高，（4）TPT合同可以实现完美的协调，为制造商和零售商带来更高的利润。补充信息：在线版本包含补充材料，请访问10.1007/s10479-023-05372-9。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Annals of Operations Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

7.90

自引率

16.70%

发文量

596

审稿时长

8.4 months

期刊介绍： The Annals of Operations Research publishes peer-reviewed original articles dealing with key aspects of operations research, including theory, practice, and computation. The journal publishes full-length research articles, short notes, expositions and surveys, reports on computational studies, and case studies that present new and innovative practical applications. In addition to regular issues, the journal publishes periodic special volumes that focus on defined fields of operations research, ranging from the highly theoretical to the algorithmic and the applied. These volumes have one or more Guest Editors who are responsible for collecting the papers and overseeing the refereeing process.