{"title":"Fertility and reproductive preferences in post-transitional societies","authors":"J. Bongaarts","doi":"10.31899/PGY6.1015","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"THE TIMING OF the onset of contemporary fertility transitions and the pace of change during their early phases have been central concerns of researchers and policymakers in recent decades. Demographers and social scientists have studied survey data with detailed information about reproductive behaviors and attitudes of individuals in many countries. This research has provided new insights into the determinants of reproductive behavior and has contributed to the development of increasingly refined and realistic theories of fertility change. Policymakers and program managers in the developing world have been concerned about the contribution of high fertility to rapid population growth and poor reproductive health, and they have focused on implementing effective programs-in practice, mostly family planning programs-to reduce high and unwanted fertility. Until recently, less attention had been given to determinants and consequences of fertility in post-transitional societies. Conventional demographic theories have little to say about the level at which fertility will stabilize at the end of the transition. However, it is usually assumed that population growth in the long run will be near zero, which implies that fertility will on average be close to the replacement level of about 2.1 births per woman (Demeny 1997; Caldwell 1982; Freedman and Berelson 1974). This assumption is, for example, incorporated in past population projections of the United Nations and the World Bank (medium variants). If fertility in contemporary post-transitional societies had indeed leveled off at or near the replacement level, there would have been limited interest in the subject because this would have been expected. However, fertility has dropped below the replacement level-sometimes by a substantial margin-in virtually every population that has moved through the demographic transition. If future fertility remains at these low levels, populations will decline in size and will age rapidly. These demographic developments in","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":" ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"400","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31899/PGY6.1015","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 400
Abstract
THE TIMING OF the onset of contemporary fertility transitions and the pace of change during their early phases have been central concerns of researchers and policymakers in recent decades. Demographers and social scientists have studied survey data with detailed information about reproductive behaviors and attitudes of individuals in many countries. This research has provided new insights into the determinants of reproductive behavior and has contributed to the development of increasingly refined and realistic theories of fertility change. Policymakers and program managers in the developing world have been concerned about the contribution of high fertility to rapid population growth and poor reproductive health, and they have focused on implementing effective programs-in practice, mostly family planning programs-to reduce high and unwanted fertility. Until recently, less attention had been given to determinants and consequences of fertility in post-transitional societies. Conventional demographic theories have little to say about the level at which fertility will stabilize at the end of the transition. However, it is usually assumed that population growth in the long run will be near zero, which implies that fertility will on average be close to the replacement level of about 2.1 births per woman (Demeny 1997; Caldwell 1982; Freedman and Berelson 1974). This assumption is, for example, incorporated in past population projections of the United Nations and the World Bank (medium variants). If fertility in contemporary post-transitional societies had indeed leveled off at or near the replacement level, there would have been limited interest in the subject because this would have been expected. However, fertility has dropped below the replacement level-sometimes by a substantial margin-in virtually every population that has moved through the demographic transition. If future fertility remains at these low levels, populations will decline in size and will age rapidly. These demographic developments in
近几十年来,当代生育率转变的开始时间和早期阶段的变化速度一直是研究人员和政策制定者关注的中心问题。人口学家和社会科学家研究了许多国家关于个人生育行为和态度的详细信息的调查数据。这项研究为生殖行为的决定因素提供了新的见解,并有助于发展日益完善和现实的生育变化理论。发展中国家的政策制定者和项目管理者一直关注高生育率对人口快速增长和生殖健康不良的影响,他们一直致力于实施有效的方案——在实践中,主要是计划生育方案——以减少高生育率和不必要的生育率。直到最近,对过渡后社会中生育率的决定因素和后果的注意较少。传统的人口理论对人口转型结束时生育率稳定在什么水平几乎没有什么说法。然而,通常假定长期的人口增长将接近于零,这意味着生育率将平均接近每名妇女生育2.1个孩子的更替水平(Demeny 1997;考德威尔1982;Freedman and Berelson 1974)。例如,这一假设已纳入联合国和世界银行过去的人口预测(中位数)。如果当代转型后社会的生育率确实稳定在更替水平或接近更替水平,那么人们对这一主题的兴趣就会有限,因为这是意料之中的。然而,在几乎所有经历过人口结构转型的人口中,生育率都降到了更替水平以下,有时降得相当大。如果未来的生育率保持在这样的低水平,人口数量将会下降,并将迅速老龄化。这些人口发展