State Incapacity by Design: Understanding the Bihar Story

Santhosh Mathew, Mick Moore
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引用次数: 48

Abstract

The Indian state of Bihar has long been a byword for bad governance. It was however governed particularly badly between 1990 and 2005, and has since experienced something of a ‘governance miracle’. How can we account for the 1990–2005 deterioration? The answer lies in the interaction of three factors. The first was the type of leadership exercised by Lalu Prasad Yadav, who was Chief Minister throughout most of this period – even when his wife formally occupied the post. The second lies in electoral politics: the need to maintain the enthusiasm and morale of an electoral coalition that Yadav had constructed from a number of poorer and historically oppressed groups. Such was the scale of poverty among this core electoral coalition that Yadav had limited prospects of maintaining its cohesion and allegiance through the normal processes of promising ‘development’ and using networks of political patronage to distribute material resources to supporters. More important, that strategy would have involved a high level of dependence on the government apparatus, that was dominated by people from a number of historically-dominant upper castes. That is our third factor. Yadav preferred to mobilise his supporters on the basis of continual confrontation with this historically oppressive elite. He kept public sector jobs vacant rather than appoint qualified people – who were mainly from the upper cases. He tried to micro-manage the state apparatus from the Chief Minister's office. He denuded the public service of staff. He was then unable to use it to deliver ‘development’. We show that, among other things, the Bihar state government sacrificed large potential fiscal transfers from the Government of India designed for anti-poverty programmes because it was unable to complete the relevant bureaucratic procedures. Yadav knowingly undermined the capacity of the state apparatus. There are parallels in many other parts of the world. Low state capacity is often a political choice.

设计的国家无能:理解比哈尔邦的故事
印度比哈尔邦长期以来一直是治理不善的代名词。然而,在1990年至2005年期间,它的治理尤其糟糕,此后经历了某种“治理奇迹”。我们如何解释1990-2005年的恶化?答案在于三个因素的相互作用。第一种是拉鲁·普拉萨德·亚达夫(Lalu Prasad Yadav)的领导方式,他在这一时期的大部分时间里都是首席部长——即使他的妻子正式担任该职位。其次是选举政治:需要保持亚达夫建立的选举联盟的热情和士气,这个联盟是由许多较贫穷和历史上受压迫的群体组成的。核心选举联盟的贫困程度如此之高,以至于亚达夫通过承诺“发展”和利用政治赞助网络向支持者分配物质资源的正常过程来维持其凝聚力和忠诚的前景有限。更重要的是,这种策略涉及到对政府机构的高度依赖,而政府机构是由一些历史上占统治地位的上层种姓的人控制的。这是第三个因子。亚达夫更愿意在与历史上压迫性的精英持续对抗的基础上动员他的支持者。他让公共部门的职位空缺,而不是任用合格的人——这些人主要来自上层社会。他试图在首席部长办公室里对国家机器进行微观管理。他剥夺了公务员的公共服务。然后他就无法用它来实现“发展”。我们表明,除其他事项外,比哈尔邦政府牺牲了印度政府为反贫困计划设计的大量潜在财政转移,因为它无法完成相关的官僚程序。亚达夫故意破坏了国家机器的能力。世界上许多其他地方也有类似的情况。低国家产能往往是一种政治选择。
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