Mix-and-match divestitures and merger harm

IF 1.5 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

We consider the effects of a merger combined with a divestiture that mixes and matches the assets of the two pre-merger suppliers into one higher-cost and one lower-cost post-merger supplier. Such mix-and-match transactions leave the number of suppliers in a market unchanged but, as we show, can be procompetitive or anticompetitive depending on whether buyers are powerful and on the extent of outside competition. A powerful buyer can benefit from a divestiture that creates a lower-cost supplier, even if it causes the second-lowest cost to increase. In contrast, a buyer without power is always harmed by a weakening of the competitive constraint on the lowest-cost supplier.

混搭式资产剥离和合并损害
我们考虑合并与资产剥离相结合的影响,将合并前的两个供应商的资产混合并匹配为一个高成本和一个低成本的合并后供应商。这种混配交易使市场上供应商的数量保持不变,但正如我们所展示的,它可以是促进竞争的,也可以是反竞争的,这取决于买家是否强大,以及外部竞争的程度。一个强大的买家可以从资产剥离中获益,从而创造出一个成本较低的供应商,即使这会导致成本第二低的供应商上升。相反,没有权力的买方总是因为对最低成本供应商的竞争约束减弱而受到损害。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
15
期刊介绍: Started in 1950 by a group of leading Japanese economists under the title The Economic Studies Quarterly, the journal became the official publication of the Japanese Economic Association in 1959. As its successor, The Japanese Economic Review has become the Japanese counterpart of The American Economic Review, publishing substantial economic analysis of the highest quality across the whole field of economics from researchers both within and outside Japan. It also welcomes innovative and thought-provoking contributions with strong relevance to real economic issues, whether political, theoretical or policy-oriented.
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