{"title":"Mix-and-match divestitures and merger harm","authors":"Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx","doi":"10.1111/jere.12237","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider the effects of a merger combined with a divestiture that mixes and matches the assets of the two pre-merger suppliers into one higher-cost and one lower-cost post-merger supplier. Such mix-and-match transactions leave the number of suppliers in a market unchanged but, as we show, can be procompetitive or anticompetitive depending on whether buyers are powerful and on the extent of outside competition. A powerful buyer can benefit from a divestiture that creates a lower-cost supplier, even if it causes the second-lowest cost to increase. In contrast, a buyer without power is always harmed by a weakening of the competitive constraint on the lowest-cost supplier.</p>","PeriodicalId":45642,"journal":{"name":"Japanese Economic Review","volume":"70 3","pages":"346-366"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2019-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jere.12237","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Japanese Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jere.12237","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
We consider the effects of a merger combined with a divestiture that mixes and matches the assets of the two pre-merger suppliers into one higher-cost and one lower-cost post-merger supplier. Such mix-and-match transactions leave the number of suppliers in a market unchanged but, as we show, can be procompetitive or anticompetitive depending on whether buyers are powerful and on the extent of outside competition. A powerful buyer can benefit from a divestiture that creates a lower-cost supplier, even if it causes the second-lowest cost to increase. In contrast, a buyer without power is always harmed by a weakening of the competitive constraint on the lowest-cost supplier.
期刊介绍:
Started in 1950 by a group of leading Japanese economists under the title The Economic Studies Quarterly, the journal became the official publication of the Japanese Economic Association in 1959. As its successor, The Japanese Economic Review has become the Japanese counterpart of The American Economic Review, publishing substantial economic analysis of the highest quality across the whole field of economics from researchers both within and outside Japan. It also welcomes innovative and thought-provoking contributions with strong relevance to real economic issues, whether political, theoretical or policy-oriented.