Incorporation, Total Incorporation, and Nothing But Incorporation?

Christopher R. Green
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Kurt Lash’s The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship (2014) defends the view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” cover only rights enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution. My own book, however, Equal Citizenship, Civil Rights, and the Constitution: The Original Sense of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (2015), reads the Clause to broadly guarantee equality among similarly-situated citizens of the United States. Incorporation of an enumerated right into the Fourteenth Amendment requires, I say, national consensus such that an outlier state’s invasion of the right would produce inequality among citizens of the United States. Lash and I agree about a great deal, but this Essay provides a focused explanation of the clash between our two books.Searchable electronic databases have produced an amazing variety of new evidence and argument related to the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning and the enumerated-right controversy. Lash’s book shows vividly that there is an enormous amount that Black, Frankfurter, Fairman and Crosskey failed to uncover. Here, I raise six problems for Lash’s enumerated-rights-only view: (a) the gulf between the constitutional needs of the Founding and Reconstruction, (b) the inherent unabridgeability of federally-enumerated rights through state action, (c) textual and historical complications for sharply distinguishing Article IV from the Fourteenth Amendment, (d) equality-focused interpretations of the Louisiana Cession language and of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, explaining the Clause in terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, (e) 1866 disputes over voting rights and indefiniteness, incomprehensible on the enumerated-rights-only view, and (f) subsequent-interpretation evidence, especially the use of the enumerated-rights-only view against the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
公司,完全公司,还是只是公司?
库尔特·拉什的《第十四修正案与美国公民的特权和豁免权》(2014)捍卫的观点是,第十四修正案的“美国公民的特权或豁免权”只涵盖宪法其他地方列举的权利。然而,我自己的书《平等的公民身份、公民权利和宪法:特权或豁免条款的原始意义》(2015年)将该条款解读为广泛保障美国同等地位公民之间的平等。我说,将列举的权利纳入第十四修正案需要全国达成共识,这样一个例外州对这项权利的侵犯将在美国公民中产生不平等。拉什和我在很多方面意见一致,但这篇文章对我们两本书之间的冲突提供了一个集中的解释。可搜索的电子数据库已经产生了与第十四修正案的原意和列举权争议有关的各种各样的新证据和论点。拉什的书生动地展示了布莱克、法兰克福、费尔曼和克罗斯基未能发现的大量真相。在这里,我为拉什的“只列举权利”观点提出了六个问题:(a)建国和重建的宪法需求之间的鸿沟;(b)联邦列举的权利通过州行为固有的不可撤销性;(c)将第四条与第十四修正案明显区分开来的文本和历史复杂性;(d)对路易斯安那州割让语和特权或豁免条款的以平等为中心的解释,以1866年《民权法案》为依据解释该条款;(e) 1866年关于投票权和不确定性的争议,仅以列举权利的观点无法理解,以及(f)随后的解释证据,特别是使用仅以列举权利的观点反对1875年的《民权法案》。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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