A Peircean Approach to Programs for Routine Expansion of Belief

IF 0.2 4区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI:10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.57.4.01

K. Stroh

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract:This paper engages with Isaac Levi's approach to justifying changes in our states of full belief and offers a Peircean criticism of his strategy for resolving conflicts between the results of what inquirers deem to be the most reliable programs for a given situation and the settled beliefs about which we have no doubts. In the first section, I discuss the central features of Levi's theory of justifying changes to our state of full belief. In the second section, I present a Peircean approach to evaluating the reliability of these programs for routine expansion of belief, and I argue that there is a conflict between Levi's approach to situations where an inquirer has expanded her beliefs into inconsistency and Peirce's criticisms of non-scientific methods for settling opinion. The third section presents two potential objections to the Peircean approach, objections that emphasize the importance of our concern to avoid error, and in the fourth section, I propose an original supplement to the Peircean approach that better addresses that concern. Ultimately, my aim is to develop and defend a Peircean approach that is in opposition to Levi's views about when it is appropriate to question the reliability of our programs for routine expansion of belief but that also addresses his legitimate worries about underemphasizing our concern to avoid error.

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例行信仰扩展程序的一种方法

摘要:本文探讨了艾萨克·列维(Isaac Levi)为我们的完全信念状态的变化辩护的方法，并对他解决调查者认为在特定情况下最可靠的方案的结果与我们毫无疑问的既定信念之间的冲突的策略提出了皮尔斯式的批评。在第一部分中，我讨论了利瓦伊理论的中心特征，即证明我们完全信仰状态的变化是正当的。在第二部分，我提出了一种Peircean的方法来评估这些常规信念扩展程序的可靠性，我认为在列维(Levi)处理调查者将她的信念扩展到不一致的情况的方法与Peirce对解决意见的非科学方法的批评之间存在冲突。第三部分提出了对皮尔琴方法的两种潜在的反对意见，这些反对意见强调了我们关注避免错误的重要性，在第四部分，我提出了对皮尔琴方法的原始补充，以更好地解决这一问题。最终，我的目标是发展和捍卫一种皮尔斯式的方法，这种方法与利瓦伊的观点相反，利瓦伊认为什么时候应该质疑我们日常信仰扩展计划的可靠性，但这也解决了他对低估我们对避免错误的关注的合理担忧。

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来源期刊

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society has been the premier peer-reviewed journal specializing in the history of American philosophy since its founding in 1965. Although named for the founder of American pragmatism, American philosophers of all schools and periods, from the colonial to the recent past, are extensively discussed. TCSPS regularly includes essays, and every significant book published in the field is discussed in a review essay. A subscription to the journal includes membership in the Charles S. Peirce Society, which was founded in 1946 by Frederic H. Young. The purpose of the Society is to encourage study of and communication about the work of Peirce and its ongoing influence in the many fields of intellectual endeavor to which he contributed.