Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power

D. Hart
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引用次数: 10

Abstract

Conventional wisdom has it that modern contract law evolved at least in part to address problems created (or ignored) by the classical legal system. Consequently, modern contract law is different from classical contract in ways that make the current system work better than the regime it ostensibly replaced. For this to be true, however, the changes made by modern contract have to be effective in rectifying the problems engendered by the classical system. But herein lays the problem. Modern contract identified coercion in the bargaining process that produces a bad bargain as a problem serious enough to warrant a solution. The solution came in the form of “expanded” contract policing doctrines, like unconscionability, economic duress, and misrepresentation. But modern contract’s solution to the coercion/bad bargain problem has failed. Indeed, the modern system makes the coercion problem worse, because it only partially rejected classical contract, while retaining key parts of the older regime. More specifically, modern contract law leaves the core of classical contract - contract formation - completely intact. And contract formation, particularly in the doctrine of mutual assent, is where the power in contracting is created, embedded and, under modern contract law, largely immunized from effective challenge by the contract policing doctrines. Consequently, by leaving the core of contract intact, modern contract law has ensured that the expanded policing doctrines it adopted will not alleviate, let alone correct, the coercion problem. Instead, it will increase the coercive capacity of the party with superior bargaining power, particularly during contract formation, and incentivize that party to use its increased coercive capacity. So, the conventional wisdom is wrong. The differences between the classical and modern contract law systems are not the most important part of the evolutionary story. Instead, understanding the ways in which the two systems are the same is more critical in determining whether modern contract law is in fact, or will be, successful in tempering the harshest aspects of the classical contract law system.
契约的形成和权力的巩固
传统观点认为,现代合同法的发展至少在一定程度上是为了解决古典法律体系造成(或忽视)的问题。因此,现代合同法与古典契约的不同之处在于,现行制度比它表面上取代的制度运行得更好。然而,要做到这一点,现代契约所做的改变必须有效地纠正古典制度所产生的问题。但问题就在这里。现代契约将议价过程中的强制视为一个严重到需要采取解决措施的问题,而这种强制导致了糟糕的议价。解决方案以“扩大”合同监管理论的形式出现,如不合理、经济胁迫和虚假陈述。但现代契约对强制/坏交易问题的解决已经失败。事实上,现代制度使强制问题变得更糟,因为它只是部分地拒绝了古典契约,同时保留了旧制度的关键部分。更具体地说,现代合同法完全保留了古典合同的核心——合同的形成。合同的形成,特别是在相互同意的原则中,是合同权力被创造和嵌入的地方,在现代合同法下,很大程度上免受合同监管原则的有效挑战。因此,由于保留了合同的核心,现代合同法确保了它所采用的扩大的监管理论不会减轻,更不用说纠正强制问题了。相反,它将增加具有优势议价能力的一方的强制能力,特别是在合同形成期间,并激励该方使用其增加的强制能力。所以,传统观念是错误的。古典和现代合同法体系之间的差异并不是进化故事中最重要的部分。相反,理解这两种体系相同的方式对于确定现代合同法是否实际上或将会成功地缓和古典合同法体系中最严酷的方面更为关键。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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