Trade Intermediation and the Organization of Exporters

Gabriel Felbermayr, B. Jung
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引用次数: 121

Abstract

The business literature and recent descriptive evidence show that exporting rms typically require the help of foreign trade intermediaries or need to set up own foreign wholesale aliates. In contrast, conventional trade theory models assume that producers can directly access foreign consumers. This paper introduces intermediaries in an international trade model where producers dier with respect to productivity as well as regarding their varieties’ perceived quality and tradability. We assume that trade intermediation is prone to frictions due to the absence of enforceable cross-country contracts while own wholesale subsidiaries require capital investment. We derive the sorting pattern of rms according to their degree of competitive advantage and show how the relative prevalence of intermediation depends on the degree of heterogeneity among producers, on the importance of market-specicity of goods, or on expropriation risk. We use US export data for 50 sectors and 133 destination countries to check the empirical validity of this predictions and nd robust empirical support.
贸易中介和出口商组织
商业文献和最近的描述性证据表明,出口企业通常需要外贸中介机构的帮助,或者需要建立自己的国外批发分公司。相比之下,传统的贸易理论模型假设生产者可以直接接触到外国消费者。本文介绍了一个国际贸易模型中的中间商,在这个模型中,生产者既考虑生产率,也考虑品种的感知质量和可贸易性。我们假设贸易中介容易发生摩擦,因为缺乏可执行的跨国合同,而自己的批发子公司需要资本投资。我们根据rms的竞争优势程度推导出rms的分类模式,并展示了中介的相对流行程度如何取决于生产者之间的异质性程度、商品的市场特异性的重要性或征用风险。我们使用美国50个行业和133个目的地国家的出口数据来检验这一预测的实证有效性和强有力的实证支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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