{"title":"The Frontlines Have Shifted: Explaining the Persistence of Pro-State Militias after Civil War","authors":"D. Shaw, H. Aliyev","doi":"10.1080/1057610x.2021.2009633","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Many ceasefire and peace agreements stipulate the disarmament and demobilization of pro-state armed groups involved in the conflict, yet few of these groups ever completely demobilize. This study seeks to explain the process of incomplete demobilization by advancing a theoretical argument that pro-state armed groups are least likely to disarm and demobilize when the monopoly on violence is frag- mented, and when there is relative balance of capabilities and interests between the government and pro-state armed groups. Under these circumstances, both governments and pro-state armed groups may favor incomplete demobilization enabling them to pursue their strategic objectives. We draw on unique interview data with pro-state paramilitaries from Ukraine to empirically illustrate our theoretical expectations. or peace accords which stipulate demobilization of pro-government armed groups. This article presents a set of theoretical expectations which seek to explain the phenomenon of incomplete demobilization, drawing on a number of empirical examples before illustrating our theoretical","PeriodicalId":38834,"journal":{"name":"Studies in Conflict & Terrorism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studies in Conflict & Terrorism","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2021.2009633","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Many ceasefire and peace agreements stipulate the disarmament and demobilization of pro-state armed groups involved in the conflict, yet few of these groups ever completely demobilize. This study seeks to explain the process of incomplete demobilization by advancing a theoretical argument that pro-state armed groups are least likely to disarm and demobilize when the monopoly on violence is frag- mented, and when there is relative balance of capabilities and interests between the government and pro-state armed groups. Under these circumstances, both governments and pro-state armed groups may favor incomplete demobilization enabling them to pursue their strategic objectives. We draw on unique interview data with pro-state paramilitaries from Ukraine to empirically illustrate our theoretical expectations. or peace accords which stipulate demobilization of pro-government armed groups. This article presents a set of theoretical expectations which seek to explain the phenomenon of incomplete demobilization, drawing on a number of empirical examples before illustrating our theoretical
期刊介绍:
Terrorism and insurgency are now the dominant forms of conflict in the world today. Fuelled by moribund peace processes, ethnic and religious strife, disputes over natural resources, and transnational organized crime, these longstanding security challenges have become even more violent and intractable: posing new threats to international peace and stability. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism aims to cast new light on the origins and implications of conflict in the 21st Century and to illuminate new approaches and solutions to countering the growth and escalation of contemporary sub-state violence.