Global Dynamics of an Oligopoly Game Model with Nonlinear Costs and Strategic Delegation

Wei Zhou, Yuxia Liu, Rui Xue
{"title":"Global Dynamics of an Oligopoly Game Model with Nonlinear Costs and Strategic Delegation","authors":"Wei Zhou, Yuxia Liu, Rui Xue","doi":"10.1142/S0218127423500827","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A dynamic oligopoly game model with nonlinear cost and strategic delegation is built on the basis of isoelastic demand in this paper. And the dynamic characteristics of this game model are investigated. The local stability of the boundary equilibrium points is analyzed by means of the stability theory and Jacobian matrix, and the stability region of the Nash equilibrium point is obtained by Jury criterion. It is concluded that the system may lose stability through Flip bifurcation and Neimark–Sacker bifurcation. And the effects of speed of adjustment, price elasticity, profit weight coefficient and marginal cost on the system stability are discussed through numerical simulation. After that, the coexistence of attractors is analyzed through the basin of attraction, where multiple stability always means path dependence, implying that the long-term behavior of enterprises is strongly affected by historical contingency. In other words, a small perturbation of the initial conditions will have a significant impact on the system. In addition, the global dynamical behavior of the system is analyzed by using the critical curves, the basin of attraction, absorbing areas and a noninvertible map, revealing that three global bifurcations, the first two of which are caused by the interconversion of simply-connected and multiply-connected regions in the basin of attraction, and the third global bifurcation, that is, the final bifurcation is caused by the contact between attractors and the boundary of the basin of attraction.","PeriodicalId":13688,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Bifurc. Chaos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Int. J. Bifurc. Chaos","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218127423500827","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

A dynamic oligopoly game model with nonlinear cost and strategic delegation is built on the basis of isoelastic demand in this paper. And the dynamic characteristics of this game model are investigated. The local stability of the boundary equilibrium points is analyzed by means of the stability theory and Jacobian matrix, and the stability region of the Nash equilibrium point is obtained by Jury criterion. It is concluded that the system may lose stability through Flip bifurcation and Neimark–Sacker bifurcation. And the effects of speed of adjustment, price elasticity, profit weight coefficient and marginal cost on the system stability are discussed through numerical simulation. After that, the coexistence of attractors is analyzed through the basin of attraction, where multiple stability always means path dependence, implying that the long-term behavior of enterprises is strongly affected by historical contingency. In other words, a small perturbation of the initial conditions will have a significant impact on the system. In addition, the global dynamical behavior of the system is analyzed by using the critical curves, the basin of attraction, absorbing areas and a noninvertible map, revealing that three global bifurcations, the first two of which are caused by the interconversion of simply-connected and multiply-connected regions in the basin of attraction, and the third global bifurcation, that is, the final bifurcation is caused by the contact between attractors and the boundary of the basin of attraction.
具有非线性成本和战略委托的寡头垄断博弈模型的全局动力学
本文在等弹性需求的基础上,建立了具有非线性成本和战略委托的寡头垄断动态博弈模型。并对该博弈模型的动态特性进行了研究。利用稳定性理论和雅可比矩阵分析了边界平衡点的局部稳定性,利用Jury准则得到了纳什平衡点的稳定区域。通过Flip分岔和neimmark - sacker分岔,系统可能失去稳定性。并通过数值模拟讨论了调整速度、价格弹性、利润权重系数和边际成本对系统稳定性的影响。之后,通过吸引力盆地分析吸引子的共存,其中多重稳定总是意味着路径依赖,这意味着企业的长期行为受到历史偶然性的强烈影响。换句话说,初始条件的微小扰动将对系统产生重大影响。此外,全球系统的动力学行为的分析利用临界曲线,吸引的盆地,吸收区和不可逆转的地图,显示三个全局分岔,前两个是互变现象造成的盆地单连通和多连通区域的吸引力,第三个全局分岔,也就是说,最后分岔是由接触引起的流动和盆地的边界之间的吸引力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信