The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and the National Colonization of State Politics

James A. Gardner
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

American federalism contemplates that states will retain a significant degree of autonomy so that state power can serve as a meaningful counterweight to national power. It is often said that states exercise this function through extraconstitutional processes centered on the political party system. That is, states influence the content of national law and protect themselves from undesirable exercises of national power by using the mechanisms of internal party processes. If this process is to work properly, however, states must retain considerable political autonomy, for the possibility of state objection to exercises of national power is merely theoretical if state political processes are not sufficiently independent of their national counterparts to enable the state to adopt and assert ends or interests different from those asserted by the national government. The evidence, however, suggests strongly that the growth of national political parties during and since the early nineteenth century created a two-way street. Parties not only offered states a way to influence national politics, but also created a reverse pathway by which national politics could influence, and in many cases overawe, any independent state-level politics. As a result, the same extraconstitutional pathways that provided states a means to protect themselves from national domination simultaneously eroded the political autonomy necessary for states to maintain the kind of independent wills contemplated by the federal arrangement. This does not mean that states lack entirely the capacity to stand up to the federal government, but it does mean that their ability to do so is limited, not necessarily for lack of power but for lack of autonomous control over their political agendas and positions. This in turn suggests a much chastened conception of what it might mean for a subnational government to have the ability to “check” national power.
国家自治的神话:联邦制、政党和国家政治的民族殖民化
美国的联邦制考虑到各州将保留相当程度的自治权,以便州权力可以作为对国家权力的有效制衡。人们常说,国家通过以政党制度为中心的宪法外程序来行使这一职能。也就是说,各州影响国家法律的内容,并通过利用党内程序的机制保护自己免受国家权力的不良行使。然而,如果要使这一过程正常运作,各州必须保持相当大的政治自主权,因为如果各州的政治过程不能充分独立于其国家对应物,使各州能够采取和维护与国家政府主张的不同的目标或利益,那么各州反对行使国家权力的可能性仅仅是理论上的。然而,有证据有力地表明,在19世纪初和自19世纪初以来,国家政党的增长创造了一条双向道路。政党不仅为各州提供了影响国家政治的途径,而且还创造了一条相反的途径,使国家政治能够影响,并在许多情况下压倒任何独立的州级政治。结果,同样的宪法外途径为各州提供了一种保护自己免受国家统治的手段,同时也侵蚀了各州维持联邦安排所设想的那种独立意志所必需的政治自主权。这并不意味着各州完全没有能力对抗联邦政府,但这确实意味着它们这样做的能力是有限的,不一定是因为缺乏权力,而是因为缺乏对其政治议程和立场的自主控制。这反过来又表明,对于地方政府拥有“制衡”国家权力的能力可能意味着什么,人们的观念得到了很大的磨练。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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