CREDIBILISTIC BIMATRIX GAME WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: BAYESIAN OPTIMISTIC EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY

IF 1 4区 计算机科学 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Jinwu Gao, Xiangfeng Yang
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引用次数: 20

Abstract

In credibilistic bimatrix games, the solution concept of (α, β)-optimistic equilibrium strategy was proposed for dealing with the situation that the two players want to optimize the optimistic value of their fuzzy objectives at confidence levels α and β, respectively. This paper goes further by assuming that the confidence levels are private information of the two players. And the so-called credibilistic bimatrix game with asymmetric information is investigated. A solution concept of Bayesian optimistic equilibrium strategy as well as its existence theorem are presented. Moreover, a sufficient and necessary condition is given for finding the Bayesian optimistic equilibrium strategy. Finally, an example is provided for illustrating purpose.
信息不对称的可信双矩阵对策:贝叶斯乐观均衡策略
在可信双矩阵对策中,针对两参与人分别在置信水平α和置信水平β上对模糊目标的乐观值进行优化的情况,提出了(α, β)-乐观均衡策略的解概念。本文进一步假设置信水平是两个参与者的私人信息。研究了具有非对称信息的可信双矩阵对策。给出了贝叶斯乐观均衡策略的解概念及其存在性定理。并给出了寻找贝叶斯乐观均衡策略的一个充要条件。最后,给出了一个例子来说明。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
48
审稿时长
13.5 months
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems is a forum for research on various methodologies for the management of imprecise, vague, uncertain or incomplete information. The aim of the journal is to promote theoretical or methodological works dealing with all kinds of methods to represent and manipulate imperfectly described pieces of knowledge, excluding results on pure mathematics or simple applications of existing theoretical results. It is published bimonthly, with worldwide distribution to researchers, engineers, decision-makers, and educators.
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