The Propriety of Expert Ethics Testimony in the Courtroom: A Discourse.

Abstract

The propriety of expert ethics testimony in the courtroom is as contentious in academic scholarship as any typical ethical debate could be. Some of the main objections to expert ethics testimony stem partly from fears that it could unduly influence judicial thinking or judgments, or foist prejudicial or idiosyncratic moral views or opinions on judicial decisions. This prospect is perceived as contrary to the tenets of a liberal, pluralistic democratic society, where moral and ethical values should ideally be shared and not dictated. Another crucial argument against expert ethics testimony is the ethicists' propensity to assume the stance of 'moral advocates' bent on pitching clients' agenda, without regards to any merits in the opponents' moral judgments. Yet another anti-expert ethics testimony posits that reliance on it will foster moral laziness. This paper joins the debate by critically analyzing the arguments for and against expert ethics testimony in the context of relevant literature and standard evidentiary rules governing judicial evaluation and admissibility of expert ethics evidence. With a discourse on the nature of moral expertise and the dynamics of expert ethics testimony as a backgrounder, the paper evaluates the validity of the hypothesis that expert ethics testimony could encourage moral tardiness, unduly influence judicial proceedings or imprint narrow, elitist, or prejudicial moral viewpoints on judicial reasoning and judgments.